Hello, America, and welcome to War, in all of its ugly glory. Just a couple of days ago, the District Court of the Southern District of Iowa dismissed not only 'Take 1', but 'Take 2' of both our actions against the criminals in Iowa...all in 1 day, in the middle of appellate procedures.
They think they've won. They are most mistaken. They believe I'll stop now. They are most mistaken. They believe the war is now over. How wrong they are.
I will now post the decision from Take 1. Commentary will, of course, ensue after every piece of bullshit posted. Remember, that about half of the claim is addressed here, the parts that they can weasel out of. The rest is duly ignored, for to address those things, would be to be liable. They have been, are, and will be LIABLE.
Note also that immunity is offered these criminals ABSOLUTELY. THIS is the part I want you to see, America. This is where you need to sit up and take notice. Crimes...some FELONIOUS, some FEDERAL, were committed, throughout...and all are immune. Social workers. Attorneys. Prosecutors. Judges. Statutes of limitations are given, but the criminals have pushed us behind these lines, and no one is responsible. This is what you must see America. It's time for the criminals to pay the price for their crimes, and it's up to me to instigate the need for these punishments. JUDGES ARE NOT GODS. STATE WORKERS ARE NOT GODS. LAWYERS...lawyers!!! THEY ARE NOT GODS! Then why do we allow them to be immune to ALL CRIMES, because they are committed in the performance of their criminal duties? BECAUSE WE HAVE NO IDEA. Well, now you do. NOW is the time we change.
I give you now the claim, part 2:
https://themightyswordamericasdeadlysins.blogspot.com/2018/07/the-fed-funny-farm-take-2annnnddd-action.html
and the decision of the court in part 1. Part 2 is coming...I had no idea the damn thing came onto ECF efile into now. Commentary will be added after part 2.
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Now, remember, this is the claim that they immediately answered with the fact that I had made no claims of damage. Then, because of this, I fixed that, added more claims, switched these people from OFFICIALS to INDIVIDUALS, added more defendants (some were actual individuals) and presented claim 2. We FULLY expected that the majority of defendants named would weasel out of claim one. We never thought they would ALL escape, nor did we think that those INDIVIDUALS named in claim two (there were even some that were not officials!!!!) would get off scot-free as well, in claim 2!!
Take note that, if you compare this answer with the claim, around exactly half of the material facts related as such in the claim are not even mentioned. Let's continue, since we can clearly see the facts in the claim...
Okay, this is a wonderful place to begin commentary. Now, we often do this, start with their "Standard of Review." Note that immediately, they begin with how you, the plaintiff, can survive a motion to dismiss (motions to dismiss, by the way, were filed by each and every defendant; or for them, in this case). Note also, that it says that it must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as TRUE (meaning, at least to me, that I shouldn't have need for evidence, at all..which there was, and plenty too); in favor of the plaintiff..unless (and here it comes), the facts alleged are CLEARLY BASELESS (see the setup?) Then it says, that what is "Clearly Baseless" is left to the discretion of the court ruling on it.....wait, WHAT? So, should that court be biased on behalf of the defending defendants...which, almost always, they are...I mean c'mon...these guys have lunch and share prostitutes and children all the time, surely. Of course, it's going to be in 'The Court's Discretion' that the plaintiffs claims are, clearly, BASELESS. We can't have our buddies going to jail! Then who will find my next prostitute at the party at Judge Price's house next week?
Notice also, the set up that, while the court construes these facts liberally and that that these facts do not have to be identified in a lot of detail (which, of course, they certainly and obviously ARE), and considers them to be true (unless they say that they're baseless); that the court demands more than a recital of 'The defendant caused me damage, and here's how'. The plaintiffs did this, with abandon. But we need more than conclusory statements...riiiiiiiight. Then notice that they mention the common sense of the court here...and yet, the common sense of THIS court seems to be disturbingly ABSENT. But OK, let's move on. Then it states that in order to consider a section 1983 action, the claimants MUST show that this action was made in clear violation of a Constitutionally guaranteed right, and that it is being done by someone acting under color of law....which, if you know anything at all, almost all 'State, City, County and Federal Actors' are, in all cases, acting under color of law, since statutes, rules, codes, ordinances, etc., are not law; and since none of the PEOPLE had anything to do with enacting those "laws", in any fashion. Not only that, but these claimants have proven, over and over, that most of these 'Agencies' are, in fact CORPORATE FICTIONS, or in layman's terms, BUSINESSES.
Now, I am going to stop commentary on this claim, mainly, because it isn't important, only in that they used it to say that we had already litigated matters stated in claim two, because they decided claim 1 like an hour before they made the decision in claim 2...which, I will also state lists all new defendants, all individually named. So, skootch on down to the next asterisk line, will ya?
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So here we are, ladies and gentlemen, claim 2's order. Oh boy, do I want you to see this one, because here, if nothing else, it's apparent that justice is not being done, and a section 1983 action is nothing short...of sheer, unadulterated horse-hockey.
Let's begin, shall we, by quoting the federal statute for a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 federal action.
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 is a federal statute, numbered 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that allows people to sue the government for civil rights violations. It applies when someone acting “under color of” state-level or local law has deprived a person of rights created by the U.S. Constitution or federal statutes.
Here is the entire section. It's important that you are aware of EXACTLY what this section says, in that it addresses WHO this action is for, and WHO it is SUPPOSED to be against.
But before we do that, let us also quote the exact definitions for ABSOLUTE, SOVEREIGN and QUALIFIED immunity. These were used as defenses...in the original answers to the original complaint. Remember, that the 2nd CLAIM was produced in order to strip them of their 'official duties' and claim against them as INDIVIDUALS...not office holders.
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: The defense of qualified immunity protects "government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY: Absolute immunity immunizes officials from suit for all official acts without regard to motive. This one almost seems to completely contradict the immunity provided above, doesn't it? It also provides, in almost the same breath, that, as long as someone is acting in a position of alleged 'authority', that they can do pretty much anything they want to anyone, even commit felony and federal crimes, without any consequences, "regardless of motive." Is this what you intended for those in authority America? I was pretty convinced that you didn't.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: Sovereign immunity was derived from British common law doctrine based on the idea that the King could do no wrong. In the United States, sovereign immunity typically applies to the federal government and state government, but not to municipalities.
Now folks, all of these immunities can only be for one purpose...for the criminals to be able to commit whatever crimes they see fit, without consequence. Why would you need immunities to protect you, if what you're doing is right? The answer, of course, is that you DON'T. If you do, then you are as good as admitting that what you're doing is wrong, you're doing wrong often, and that you're getting awfully tired of being sued for it.
Now, let's get to the 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. Here's that, then stay tuned for the brief discussion that follows it:
Now that we cleared all that up, let's rip this baby apart. Now, to start with, you'll notice that immunity was provided "judicial officers" in an amendment made in 1996. Folks, this is over 125 years after this "statute" was put into affect.
Let me ask you again, why would these officials need this immunity? Do you think that maybe they were doing a lot that was wrong, and just plain old needed this so that they could continue doing that wrong with impunity, and not be sued for it? Oh, most assuredly. Those that wanted this immunity put in place would argue that, if every judge were sued for making a bad decision, they would never be able to do what they're supposed to do; which USED TO BE their real job: judging us fairly and impartially. There's a rather glaring and huge problem with this logic...that being, now, what CAN'T they do? The answer is, thanks to this amendment - NOTHING.
Great. We just elevated these people to the status of GOD. They can NOW do whatever they want, to whomever they want, whenever they damn well feel like it...and never have to pay the price or be held accountable for, say, doing the wrong thing...or worse still, committing any ILLEGAL, UNLAWFUL, or IMMORAL crime. Yes folks....this means that, should they, during the course of your proceeding, walk up to you and, say, set you on fire...there would be no remedy or relief available to you. This sounds a little extreme maybe, considering the amount of witnesses that may be in the courtroom along with you...except, that in the majority of my state cases, there wasn't anyone there, with the exception of more people that were employed by the State. I think I was probably more afraid of what might happen in those hearings than I was in any other hearing.
You have to understand, probably more than just about anything, that this allows these "officials" the right to do whatever they want, because it will be considered part of their duty, or something they've done while operating in their official capacities or "part of the job!!" They will not be held CRIMINALLY liable for ANYTHING!!
Worse still, you need to know that these immunities have been extended to ALL people working in these positions...on ALL levels of Government! Police officers. Lawyers. Attorney Generals. To get a better grasp on how ridiculous this went in my case, there was even afforded another immunity I've never even heard of, that of QUASI-immunity. Because someone was ordered by a judge to do something concerning you, they are now given QUASI-immunity for performing that act. Can you believe this crap?
Let's just take this to the extreme, because I'm betting that, should you want to sue the county janitor for leaving the floor wet at the county building, and that wet floor caused you to slip, fall and crack yer noggin, it won't be possible, if the judge ordered him to mop the floor. Wouldn't the janitor be entitled to QUASI-immunity now? Gimme a break.
Anyone working on a city, county, State or Federal level enjoys these same privileges. Folks, if this kind of immunity is allowed to remain in affect, only CRIME, CORRUPTION, and, let's face it, DOWNRIGHT EVIL can only be the inevitable result.
By the way, this might be a great time to reign in the subject of "Confidentiality" as well, and apply it to juvenile and divorce matters, because they did this here as well in "case 1"; or "Bruce I" as they have aptly, as well as incorrectly labeled it. Because the state introduced a juvenile decision into the case...without being asked to, and without merit or the need to do so, by the way...the court is now able to seal the documents...and, if enough of these documents are introduced, allows them to seal the whole case...meaning that no one will see anything else that happens in it...meaning also that they can do whatever they want to you in the courtroom as well, since the public will now be deprived of seeing the entire proceeding.
The need for this "Confidentiality" was introduced as necessary to protect our children from whatever pain they may experience from embarrassment while enduring this sort of proceeding; or to protect them from knowing who their criminal parents were or how they could find them, and vice versa...or whatever they've said...but know this, that it has been used by those of the judiciary ABSOLUTELY in an opposite and terrible way. What this now means, where the court is concerned anyway, is that the court, and those employed at this court can NOW do....
Yes, you guessed it. They could hold a damn bachelor party during your proceeding, and no one would ever know. Hell, they could sacrifice you to whatever off-color god they might worship...with the same result. Both the immunity and confidentiality, as well as the need for these immunities need to be re-questioned, and fast....or the power the judiciary wields could feasibly become unlimited...as if it isn't already.
Now folks, comes the good part...because this stupid judge in her hurried and rushed effort to settle these matters before any real damage could be done, made some rather major boo-boos; and for the appellate court to not see this without even barely glancing at it would show some rather criminal crap going on, even there. So, instead of retyping every....single...solitary...ridiculous error she made, you can appreciate the fact that I have already typed up a rather stinging brief to this nonsense...and I will post that NOW. This will help you massively, in that you won't have to read the order, probably at all, without already knowing how she messed up.
Here then, is the type from that brief. For those of you stupid attorneys that have been back over and over to recheck for something you can use in your reply briefs? I wouldn't bother. I haven't even reached the ARGUMENT portion of this brief yet...and it is nothing short of sheer brilliance. This appellate court will have NO CHOICE but to call the whole thing an absolute sham. Uh UH UH!!! You won't get the whole thing...just the statement of facts....and only some of those, so kiss it. OKOK, you can have SOME of the discussion of error, since that's where I begin getting smart.
P.S.
Oh...and for the same attorneys? I am just about to file, on the appellate court's own record, a letter that I am sending out to John P. Sarcone this very evening. It will explain to you quite clearly why there will be no way that you will EVER win this appeal. Enjoy. As for the rest of America? Sorrrrry....gonna have to say I have no intent on spoiling the surprise. Suffice it to say that these people are about to be shakin' in their boots. Til next time, my good people, til next time. :D
Let's roll, shall we?
The claimants the above captioned
case, claimant Christopher (Bruce) the living man and Elizabeth (Bruce) the
living woman do file this brief in support of these matters.
I.
SUMMARY
OF RELEVANT FACTS
1. The
claimants filed claim of damage (#4:18-cv-40) on the date of 2/12/2018.
2. The
claimants filed motion to proceed in this case In Forma Pauperis on the date of
2/15/2018, and it took the District Court until the date of 4/05/2018; over a
month and a half, to grant the motion to the claimants; putting them on a very
tight schedule to serve the summons on the defending parties. The claimants paid a friend of theirs, who
served summons to those employees of the State of Iowa, the defending parties
of Polk County, and those of the AG’s office; at their respective law
departments. All other defending parties
were mailed their summons via certified mail, and each was signed for. The claimants accepted that, since they were
signed for, each defending party received a copy. NOTE:
The claimants find it difficult to understand and accept that a summons
can be said to be not properly served, according to a defendant (i.e. Katherine
Beth Walker), but obviously the same defending party knows the case exists and
is claiming improper service; thereby obviously has a copy of the claim and
summons. What does this court need, if
not a receipt of service, and a denial of proper service by the dismissed party? What more can the claimants provide the
court? The body? A lock of hair? The claimants believe the fact that she’s
disputing being properly served at all should be enough to show that she has
her copy; and is using the stringent rules of service to her advantage to get
out of her part in it. And, if Ms.
Walker can get out of her part in this claim using the District Court Judge’s
logic, why couldn’t every other defending party get out of their parts the same
way? None of the summons to any
defending parties were served on their actual persons; so couldn’t they all be
dismissed using this rule? Even Tony
Reed’s attorney began claiming improper service. Finally, even he answered. Why is Katherine Walker special?
3. The
State of Iowa, defendant, on the date of 5/14, 2018, did file a motion to seal
documents filed by them in the case, (that were totally irrelevant to the
entirely NEW lawful claims that were actually referenced by the plaintiffs;)
and stated, along with every other defendant unerringly, in their respective
answers, that the plaintiffs were allegedly attempting to bring “an appeal from
a juvenile case;” a total fabrication and unfounded assumption; since the
claims made by the plaintiffs cover over 8 state cases, both Juvenile and
criminal; and when they did so, the court granted the order, on the SAME DAY it
was filed via text order, and sent the written order, IMMEDIATELY, to the
claimants. The claimants then replied to
this filing; and stated that these documents were filed and sealed in error,
and no order from this court has, to this day, addressed the claimants’
rebuttal for the need to seal these documents, let alone did not address the
need for these documents to be filed in this case at ALL; as that need to do so
was also rebutted.
4. On
the date of 5/22/2018; the defendant Lucas Taylor, by and through his attorney
Helen C. Adams did motion the district court for an extension of time to answer
the plaintiffs’ claim. The district court
granted this motion immediately ON THE SAME DAY, via Text order.
5. The
Court, on 5/31/2018, ordered the plaintiffs to immediately provide proof of
service on defendants Katherine Walker and Anthony Reed, so that both could
either be dismissed (were they not properly served,) or so that they might
answer to the claim filed by the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs did so, per the order of the district court, and filed
proof of service on 6/6/2018; and the district court did NOTHING, until the day
these matters were decided, September 21st, 2018.
6. Claimant
Christopher filed motion to file electronically on 6/6/2018. Court granted this motion 5 days later.
7. The
claimants motioned the District Court for an immediate permanent injunction
against one of the defendants, John P. Sarcone, on the date of 6/19/2018,
stopping him from taking unreasonable and unlawful action against plaintiff
Christopher; for actions outside the scope of his office and duties. The County Attorney has absolutely no need to
contact Government Law Enforcement across the country, in an effort to stop the
claimant, Christopher, from speaking freely, as the case may be. The district court did NOTHING concerning
this motion until September 21st, after petition was filed with the
appellate courts for a Writ of Mandamus.
8. The
plaintiffs then asked the district court to dismiss stated and NAMED defendants
from the case in dispute immediately; so the plaintiffs could then file a new
claim against most of the same defendants in their individual capacities (4:18-cv-223;)
on the date of 6/20/2018; and the district court did NOTHING concerning this
motion until the day these matters were decided.
9. After
waiting for the district court’s response to the motion to dismiss certain
defendants and keep others; filed on the date referenced in item 8 of this section,
claimants filed motions to have evidentiary hearings and set a scheduling
conference on the date of 7/13/2018. The
court then IMMEDIATELY denied these motions filed by the claimants via Text order
within a couple of days, utilizing the absurd and already disproved reason that
the court had no clear idea, nor they appear to be able to make a clear
determination who the defendants in the case were at that time, though the
defendants the claimants asked to have dismissed and remaining as parties were
clearly named in the afore-mentioned motion filed by these claimants.
10. The Plaintiffs then, on the date of
7/13/2018, and according to stated rules of Federal Procedure, filed motion to
the district court to award relief sought in fraction against defendant
Katherine Walker, so named, and the district court did NOTHING; even though the
time for her answer to be filed in this action was well past the original answer
date; as well as far past the date the claimants provided proof of service, per
the district court request (over 2 months.)
Then, Ms. Walker was released in the Judge’s order, based SOLELY on
improper service; on September 21st, 2018. Until this date, nothing concerning this
matter, save the order that ordered the claimants to file proof of service for
defendant Walker is even on the record of the court FROM the court, in either
case. This indicates to the plaintiffs
that the District Court Judge has been directly communicating with Defendant
Walker ex parte, and off the record.
This is a clear violation of the plaintiff’s due process rights.
11. The plaintiffs then filed with the district
court, on the date of 7/25/18, a demand for the district court to take action,
in a timely fashion, for the claimants’ motions; as it is obvious to the
Appellate Court that they do so for the defendants; immediately; or at least in
accordance with the district court’s own rules of civil procedure.
12.
On the date of 7/29/18; the claimants
did file a letter on the record, and mailed this letter to the chief justice,
Chief Justice Jarvey, asking him if he would address this issue. Chief Justice Jarvey did nothing, in
response.
13. The claimants then filed a petition, asking
for a Writ of Continuing Mandamus for the 8th Circuit Appellate
Court.
14. Upon asking the District Court for their
response (there was a letter in error for the clerk, then a proper one was sent
out) the District Court then chose to act on both suits and decided both
matters in error within an hour of each other; and chose to dismiss both
actions on September 21st, 2018.
II.
Discussion
of Error
1. The claimants wish to first address
filings made in both cases. In the first
claim, claimants did as they were told.
They listed facts in detail and hoped that this would suffice for a
claim. They obviously did so in error,
since immediate answers and motions to dismiss followed, all stating that there
were no claims of damage made upon which relief could be awarded. The claimants replied to all of these answers
and resisted the motions to dismiss in kind; but decided that, since error had
been pointed out so redundantly (using almost the exact same words and same
reasons, no less, from each and every single defendant’s attorneys) that they
would then file a new claim in a new suit, correcting this error; then moved to
dismiss, as defendants, all claiming to be employees of their respective
corporate fictions/Government Service Corporations and acting in their official
capacities; switched all the defending parties to the status of “Individuals”
(since one attorney had expressly noted this error in his motion to dismiss);
added more defendants and 14 more pages to the claim; added the missing claims
of damage; and resubmitted it into a new case -- 4:18-cv-223. Six defendants were asked to remain that had
already been named as individuals; but were added to the new action, since it
would obviously be dismissed, as no claims of damage were properly made by the
claimants. It’s also important to
mention that the claimants had filed viable evidence in response to answers
given by the defendants in “Bruce I”; but since references had been made to the
vagueness of the claim in that action (even though it was heavily detailed for
over 49 pages); the claimants decided to give the court a massive increase in
evidence; including court and other documentation in support of the violation
of the claimants rights wholly; concerning, as stated, the violations of their
civil, due process, Constitutional, and unalienable rights. The filing of these exhibits had not been
completed as yet, since summons had not even been issued to the claimants in
the new matter; thereby the claimants felt they had time to complete the task
before it was hurriedly and rashly decided before the summons were even issued,
on September 21st, 2018. The exhibits
for the months the claimants DID manage to get filed (the claimants do not even
believe they had finished filing for the entire first year yet; and there are
over 40 that we remember filing), paint a crystal clear picture, not only of these
violations of the claimants’ rights; but the conspiracy against the claimants’
rights as well; and served to further show the activities engaged in for profit;
as well as the scope and range of these activities. Finally, they more than show and prove a very
obvious meeting of the minds between varying defendants at varying times. The claimants chose to file these additional
exhibits to avoid the inevitable possibility for dismissal using the terms
“clearly baseless allegations,” “Threadbare accusations” and “Wholly Conclusory
Statements” to justify said dismissal; but obviously there was a lot more
needed. Evidently the district court prefers
photos, video recordings, bodies, blood and other forensic proof; since papers
signed by the criminals as they committed their crimes were obviously not
enough for the district court judge.
2. Now, in discussion of the error preserved
on the record in both cases, the claimants provide these valid errors:
3. That leniency was not provided the
claimants in their pro-per claim. The
claimants are decidedly poor and cannot afford proper legal council; and the rules
of court made it quite clear that the court was not guaranteeing the claimants any
possibility of that council. The court,
therefore, should have granted leniency to the claimants, i.e., the option to
amend their complaint, something it was obvious that they had no intention of allowing,
due to their obvious wont to dismiss the action for all of the defending
parties, eventually.
\
4. The claimants choose not to address the
order addressing “Bruce I”, though reference may be made to it where it applies;
as in when a portion of the plaintiff’s claim is either absent or not evident;
or where there is a gap in the logic of the court in the 2nd claim’s
order.
5. We the claimants begin with the common
defining characteristics of a 42 U.S.C.
section 1983 action. This section
leads a plaintiff to believe that the section exists to protect citizens from
the violation of their Constitutionally guaranteed rights by those acting in
positions of alleged and granted ‘Authority’ over them; while they act in their
official capacities; or as the same engage in activities outside the scopes of
their normal duties. What the District
Court has managed to do in issuing this order is to prove; to the claimants and
every citizen in America; that there is no one that can bring a successful
claim using this section in the District Federal Court, especially without the
help of the U.S. Attorney (since several times and concerning several
allegations, the court alludes to the claimants “having no standing to bring
these allegations” by themselves.) or another attorney.
6. It’s most important for this appellate court to understand that the claimants have brought these allegations before the office of the U.S. Attorney in the respective district SEVERAL TIMES in the 4 years prior to these actions (see also the docket of the Federal District Court, which also lists other related actions that were brought by the claimants themselves at other times); and have been told by those of that office that there isn’t an action that can be brought against these officials by their offices; concerning these obvious violations. This proves, to these claimants, that there is no action, per section 1983 or any other section that can or will be brought against those in official capacity on ANY level for ANY reason, since the determination to file charges has been limited to a single official and his offices in kind in each district – the respective U.S. Attorney. The claimants think that it must be that way in order to better protect those of official capacity from having to endure such matters. It also serves to prove to the claimants and to Americans everywhere that those alleged to be in ‘Authority’ over us can do whatever they want to whomever they want; whenever they choose, without possible consequence - whether the act be felonious, against federal law, or in complete violation of every right allegedly provided the citizens of our country; since almost everyone named in these actions has been dismissed utilizing immunities of all types (no matter what the position or whatever level of “Authority”); have been stated as not being under the jurisdiction of the federal district court because they were not properly proven as “served” per the court’s rules; fell outside the State of Iowa’s statute of limitations; were victims of a ‘Threadbare recital of vague and baseless statements, etc.;’ or that the claimants had no standing to bring the allegations made by them. The claimants would especially like to point out to the appellate court that each and every one of the 64 collectively named defending parties in both of these claims all found ways to skirt the claims of the plaintiffs; without fail and with the approving nod of the District Court Judge; as well as with barely an effort; even defendants that were added in the 2nd claim (titled as “Bruce II”.), and who didn’t even know that a claim against them even existed. The claimants point out further that the summons to ‘Bruce II’ weren’t even issued to the claimants to be served to the defendants listed at the time of the order deciding this action; meaning that the parties added didn’t even know this claim existed; so how can the matter be ruled on if none that were defendants had even read the new claim? The new claim had stated claims of damage added. There were 14 more pages to the new claim. Tens of new exhibits were filed, and over 100 more were due to be filed. How then can the justice of the District Court properly make an informed decision in the new claim on the same day, using pretty much the same order? This alone MUST be a grave error of the District Court in deciding these matters. The claimants ask this court to please consider the possibility that the District Court, located in Des Moines, Iowa, is obviously conspiring with those of the County and State that they are both located in; in order to help the defending parties get this matter buried once and for all, before it can do any real damage. The claimants know that to allow even one defendant to remain in these matters, and should the plaintiffs receive any of their due justice would serve to prove other wrongs done the claimants by others (in that one action of any listed defendant leads directly and unerringly to 4 or 5 other criminal actions and defendants named herein; whether the additional actions were made by the same or other defendants); and further shows the obvious bias of the district court in favor of those elected officials this claim primarily accuses of wrong-doing. The claimants wish to further argue and show another side to this reasoning, by asking the court this question: If 42 U.S.C. 1983 isn’t for the purpose that it states that it is, or doesn’t apply to any of the 64 defendants in either of the claimants’ actions; or doesn’t address Constitutional violations of the rights of citizens like these claimants, then what is its purpose, and who DOES it apply to, if not the defendants and the claimants who are listed? The claimants have given the District Federal Court a wide variety of defendants from different walks of life, and all in quite a variety of elected offices on every level; city, state, county, appellate and others who were not acting officially. Who, if not the defendants listed, does this action apply to, and who does it protect, if it doesn’t protect these claimants from damage inflicted by each and every one of the listed defendants? Finally, is the District Court saying, in defense of these defendants in these two orders and cases, that violating a citizen’s rights is OK as long as it’s done in the name of the defendants’ respective jobs, and that crimes can be freely committed without consequence against the claimants and others (the claimants define the word “crime” to mean criminal actions that, when executed by the citizens of this country, would land us in jail or prison, for a very long time, no less), while performing those duties (some that are obviously “duties” that in no way could be interpreted to be “Part of their job) are no big deal? If they are saying these things, then it is this court’s moral and Constitutional duty to find the District Court in grave error based on only the the answer to this question.
7. As to the relation and summary of the facts that were deemed to be facts by the District Court Judge in charge of the case (per the order), the claimants intend to address each of the condensed and summarized ‘Facts”, what is missing (per show of claims of damage) and intend to show how what is missing does in fact apply to the plaintiffs’ claims and desired relief. The plaintiffs will only address the actual claims of damage and relate their item numbers in doing so.
8. Per summary of relevant facts, page 2, paragraph 1, it addresses the claim of damage concerning defendant Nieman. In it, it states, as fact, that the claimants were visited by Ms. Nieman (at which time Ms. Nieman would lead the claimants to believe everything was fine, and the case would be considered to be “unfounded” and the caller would be considered as acting vindictively in her report of the claimants. Then Ms. Nieman returned the next morning, while the father was absent; to take both the mother and the child to an unannounced medical appointment at Methodist Hospital, with a pre-arranged group of doctors; an “appointment” that eventually turned into a “mandatory” 72 hour stay to observe them both; also without the claimant’s consent or knowledge. It then states that Ms. Nieman arranged to have the child, T.B., removed from the mother’s care. It doesn’t address missing allegations of conspiracy, in that Ms. Nieman pre-arranged the stay of T.B. and plaintiff Elizabeth with the Doctors and the hospital beforehand, that she told them that she wished to alter the reports of the doctors to show the child needed to be removed; neither does it state that plaintiff Elizabeth was forced to remain at the hospital the entire weekend; without her knowledge and without her consent. The child was also checked into the hospital under the same non-related pretense, also without the mother’s knowledge or her consent. The Child protective assessment only succeeded because the worker lied 55 plus times about the claimants, and that the allegations that were originally made were all discarded for new and fabricated ones and were all based on a single call made by a psychotic woman on her way out of state, who was mad at the claimants for evicting her from their home. DHS only spoke with the woman once; and weren’t able to verify, prove or charge any of these accusations at any time during either case. After this forced stay, the worker then returned to bully the plaintiff, Elizabeth, into signing a document stating that she consented to the removal of her child into the care of the Department of Human Services, and Ms. Nieman. She forged the mother’s initials into the document where the plaintiff was supposed to sign them, showing that she had read the document, and understood what was happening. The plaintiffs provided the court with an audio recorded copy of the entire unlawful removal; and if nothing else, the recording shows that plaintiff, Elizabeth, was not given a choice to sign this document; she was forced into signing it, using Ms. Nieman’s deception and legal duress. More so, the other claimant (the “legal father” wasn’t present to give his “consent”, though he had all right to be. It also totally discludes all mention of the obvious intent to fake the Polk County and State of Iowa’s jurisdiction over the claimants and their newborn daughter; when they deprived the mother, through the act of falsifying plaintiff Elizabeth’s answer to a very important question about the mother’s possible Native American heritage; thereby depriving the mother wholly of the possibility of a different jurisdiction over them both; for over 5 months. Also missing is the fact that, per Iowa Statute, “reasonable efforts” were to be taken, as well as listed prior to this removal, to possibly prevent or eliminate the need for the removal. None were listed, and defendant William A. Price, acting as alleged ‘judge’, in his official capacity, then allegedly signed this order (we believe we have undisputable proof showing the worker also forged the Judge’s signature on this order as well; an act we do not put past her, considering the dishonest behavior we have already proved), also validating that these non-existing efforts had indeed occurred. Finally, per the recording and the form, only a very small portion of the entire order was read to the plaintiff, Elizabeth, and none of the lines that were read gave plaintiff Elizabeth even a half of an inkling what was going on and why, or her rights in this case. Elizabeth; though she did herself sign the order, did not check any of the boxes saying she had read and understood the form; and this is evident, since on the recording, it is Ms, Nieman reading to Elizabeth only the things she wants her to hear, obviously only half or less of what is stated and asked in the form; meaning Elizabeth wasn’t allowed to read any of it; nor was she given a chance to.
9. Next, the judge lights on the “irregularities” of the petition (see damage claim pertaining to Polk County Assistant Stephanie Brown; and relation of ‘Summary of Facts, page 2, paragraph 4), and summarizes the allegations made against her with one sentence, referring to the entirety of the damaged claimed by saying “the court, DHS, the county attorney’s office AND our own lawyers were working in concert against us;” using one sentence of our entire group of allegations and ignoring the rest (Id. Claim #20.) Then, concerning the allegations that described the conspiracy portion of the plaintiff’s claim against Ms. Brown, the District Court Judge then only mentions a single sentence as well, and misses the majority of the wrongful actions taken by Ms. Brown against the claimants, such as her forgery of the claimants’ signatures on the forms that were filed, forms we had allegedly signed, stating that we had received the petition for removal; when we didn’t receive a copy of that petition until September 12th, 2014, the date of the adjudication hearing, nearly a month later. These are most serious deprivations of due process.
10. Skipping all that happened between the removal and the adjudication hearing (such as the first drug test tampering, the removal hearing, etc.); the judge moves immediately on to a single claim made against attorney/defendant Mays (summary of facts, page 3, paragraph 2); mentioning only the infraction that Mays had the plaintiff, Elizabeth, file a 2nd financial affidavit a month and a half after the first went into effect; so as to portray her as having income with no expenses; without a need to do so. This is, according to the plaintiffs, just one of a dozen or more of Mr. Mays’ listed infractions…and absolutely none of the others are mentioned in the order, nor are any claims or allegations even used which could possibly show, blatantly no less, any and all of the violations of the plantiff’s rights by defendant Mays.
11. Then the District Court Judge goes on to say, in the relation of facts (page 3, paragraph 3, summary of facts), that the termination of parental rights hearing was held on September 12th, 2014. This was the date of the adjudication hearing, not the termination hearing. She then refers to when claimant Christopher was locked out from seeing documents filed by the prosecution (summary of facts, page 3, paragraph 4), a flagrant violation of the plaintiff’s due process rights, a violation that continued on past that date for well over a month and a half. Then, numerous, pertinent and relevant claim items are, once again, passed by in abundance.
12, The District Court Judge then refers directly to the claim concerning the termination hearing, and states that the parental rights were terminated (see page 5, paragraph 1). She does not refer to the fact that the biological father’s rights were initially slated to be terminated, then changed to giving the child to him; nearly unconditionally; and almost free of all responsibility; as the Judge, defendant Price and Attorney/Defendant Walker decided instead to work together to FURTHER violate the claimants’ rights; does not mention the removal of the father as an interested party of the case; makes no referral to the claimants’ motion for intervention of the Cherokee tribe in the case at THIS time period, when the case was nearly over (something the claimants finally realized they could do, after Ms. Nieman deprived them of that possibility from the beginning by falsifying the removal form and the record with her affidavit, stating that she stated that she had no ties to any tribe), discards entirely the vindictive disregard of plaintiff Elizabeth’s motion related to her rescindment of all signatures on all documents she had signed to date (expressly mentioning the DHS, Defendant attorney Mays and the courts as well); or the granting of permanency by Defendant Price to the biological father, R.S., though R.S. had not been at all involved in either juvenile case up to and including that date, nor had R.S. any interest in the child at all; nor did he even know, until DHS hunted him down where he lived, that plaintiff Elizabeth had been pregnant, had given birth to T.B., or that she had been alive for an additional 6 months past THAT time. \
13, In the paragraph that follows, the District Court Judge then refers to the instance of claim made, referring to actions taken by Mrs. Rhinehart (summary of facts, page 3, paragraph 5), actions that inadvertently threatened the Claimant Christopher’s first amendment rights, and this is clearly stated in the claim. The District Court Judge also refers to an incorrect fact that states (page 3, paragraph 5) ‘Defendant Stephanie Rhinehart informed Christopher Bruce in a telephone message he would not be allowed to visit T.B. unless he stopped writing about the termination proceedings in his blog.” The termination hearing had not occurred at this time and wouldn’t for another 4 months. Defendant Rhinehart threatened the claimant Christopher with the deprival of his visits with his daughter, if he did not stop writing on his blog about ANY events that were occurring in the case, in total. This deprivation of his ability to see his daughter continued throughout the case, and the claimant, Christopher, has not seen his daughter since September 24th, 2014.
14. A host of claim items; pointing to and proving blatant violations of both the claimants’ rights are completely passed over without comment at this time. These are related items showing events that occurred between the time of the adjudication hearing and the termination hearing. These include all the events that occurred at the permanency hearing, which the claimants state contained the most harmful and vindictive violations of the claimants’ rights, more so than all the rest, combined. Also not mentioned are the dispositional hearing, and two hearings that were held in December 2014, those that were held to allegedly “hear” motions that had been filed by the claimants; the 2nd continued one being one that included the event of a PROVEN 2nd falsification of their drug test results. The majority of these events occurred long before the termination hearing ALLEGEDLY took place. These events contain more of the more serious of the damage claims made by these claimants; and they aren’t even addressed in passing in this judge’s order.
15. The District Court Judge goes on to say (on page 4, paragraph 1, summary of facts), that the claimants had claimed the termination of parental rights hearing to be ‘fraught with error.’ The claimants do not even allude to this fact, they KNOW and CLAIMED that this hearing did not take place, AT ALL. They certainly claim error, but not because of decisions made in it, but because this hearing most certainly never happened; and no one listed as being in it or transcribing it were even there…including the claimants themselves, since the defendants involved at that time, in collusion, had smartly waylaid the claimants with a surprise warrant for claimant Christopher’s arrest for non-existing crimes, exactly one week before the termination hearing.
16. Following this (summary of facts, page 4, paragraph 2), the District Court Judge relates the plaintiffs’ claim; referring to the incident involving the Des Moines Police Department’s Jake Lancaster, DHS employees Gosch and Rhinehart, and those of the County Attorney’s offices, as they conspired together and produced charges out of thin air exactly a week prior to the termination hearing, charges using very weakly chargeable and TRANSCRIBED/FILED statements left for defending parties Nieman and Gosch on their answering machines by the claimant, Christopher; in support of the charged ‘crimes’ ; and events that had occurred (and, as they apply, had also NOT occurred at all) almost 2 months prior to the charges being filed; when the claimant, Christopher, called them both – on the weekend, at night, when the claimant knew neither would answer, absolutely. The District Judge totally omits all matters concerning the methods used to hunt plaintiff Christopher down against all logic; even up to a week AFTER his arrest and almost a full month after the termination hearing; and neglects to refer to the fact of the County Attorney’s office calling the President’s own Secret Service in order to affect Christopher’s arrest for these non-existing crimes; nor does the judge say anything in summary about the continuous libel and slander that occurred (and still occurs TO THIS DAY) without reasonable cause; abounding on every webpage, TV Station and Newspaper in the Des Moines and surrounding areas; as Mr. Lancaster went insanely above and beyond all reasonable duty charged of him as a detective of a city police detective to ensure the utter and complete destruction of the character of the plaintiff (by placing the plaintiff, Christopher, from day one, into the #1 MOST wanted criminal position for “harassing” social workers, ahead of murderers and felons, for over a month. These were charges that would, later, be plead to (the 2 simple misdemeanors) by plaintiff Christopher so he could get back home; and/or be completely dropped against him (the false aggravated misdemeanor.) The District Court Judge hides these allegations well behind a very vague and ‘conclusory’ statement instead, saying (quoting the plaintiffs here) “the defendants involved, Price, The DHS, and all at the county attorney’s offices (including and ESPECIALLY {Defendant} assistant County Attorney Kevin J. Brownell) conspired together to make sure T.B. went somewhere, ANYWHERE and to ANYONE as long as no one gave her back to” the plaintiffs.” in her reference to the single statement in the one portion of the claim made about these events (even though there were QUANTITIES of individual statements of damage made in claim; concerning this and numerous other matters.
17. On page 5, paragraph 3 (summary of facts), the District Court Judge refers to the appeal to the termination of parental rights and states the dates it was held as July 5-6, 2015; although these are the actual dates of the Child Protective Assessment appeal, in front of the ALJ at DHS. The plaintiffs can see why this appeal is hardly mentioned, since it was at this appeal that the removing entity THEMSELVES claimed the Child Protective Assessment to be “Unfounded” and in complete error, then, upon the State’s appeal up to the director of DHS, he ALSO deemed these findings of the ALJ as AFFIRMED (meaning, of course, that wrong was certainly done these claimants and that the child shouldn’t have EVER been removed in the first place – and, in effect, also showed that all the District Courts of Polk County had done against the claimants - kidnapping their child for no provable reason, depriving them of tribal intervention for the entirety of two juvenile cases, then terminating their unalienable right to parent) was also IN ERROR. She then relates actions of assistant AG Katherine Miller-Todd (who was in no way involved in this appeal), mixed in with facts from the Iowa Supreme Court appellate appeal concerning the claimant’s termination of parental rights (which was heard almost a year later, and not mentioned at all in this portion of the claim); and from the hearing appealing the Child Protective Assessment. Katherine Miller-Todd was not even affiliated with the Child Protective Assessment appeal.
18. The District Court Judge then goes on to cover the fabricated Termination hearing and its false transcripts (summary of facts, page 6, paragraph 1) and says that the claimants state error and irregularities in this appeal’s order from the Iowa Supreme Court as well; a fact agreed to vehemently by the claimants. The judge then relates and states that the Supreme Court held that claimant Christopher had no parental rights to terminate (they had to say this, in order to justify plaintiff Christopher’s illegal removal from the case as a LEGAL parent and a party of interest in T .B.; an order of the district court below it in MASSIVE error; and, subsequently, justifying defendant Price’s right to then toss his damning motions and evidence out of the case along with him) by ‘establishing paternity’ in the case, something it’s understood, generally, in the realm of law, as not normally needing to be done, since there was already a ‘legal father’, complete with all the necessary rights he most certainly had, since the law itself provides him that unarguably, in position ( i.e., plaintiff Christopher.)
19. Following all that occurred at the time of termination, the District Court Judge then skips all events that show a massive violation of plaintiff Christopher’s rights; where he was then arrested for the false charges that had been brought by the two Iowa DHS workers; and when he couldn’t be found to be arrested, was then arrested by the Secret Service, after John P. Sarcone’s offices involved them without need; and even after they had already accomplished what they wanted, the claimants to miss their termination hearing; and facts that show that this arrest was followed out to its completion, vindictively, evidently in order to teach the claimant Christopher additional lessons; such as ‘We can do whatever we want to whoever we want, whenever we want; such as using false (or in this case, non-existent) evidence to get charges filed against you, libel and slander you ruthlessly and falsely; then lie to agents of Federal Government to get you arrested, should you evade us long enough.” The District Court Judge totally missed including all the facts and evidence that showed easily how Ms. Nieman had collaborated with the County Attorney’s offices to have claimant Christopher arrested; using such evidence we had already filed in “Bruce II” as the FILED state’s transcripts of the original statements made by the plaintiff, Christopher to the 2 alleged social workers, the alleged “Victims” (these were never filed in the criminal case, by the way, because to do so would have shown the charges to be maliciously fabricated; the actual statements were filed in both our juvenile cases two months prior, just after the incident); the motion that asked the court to drop the main charge of harassment JUST BEFORE trail; and finally, the filing of the Victim Impact Statement of Ms. Nieman’s WELL AFTER the case was closed and dismissed; as well as the fact that there was, at no time, a Victim Impact Statement filed on behalf of Ms. Gosch, DHS’ other ‘victim’.
20. The ruling District Court Judge then, as she related allegations made after this (page 8, paragraph 2) refers to a relation by the claimants referring to the bond amount increase and states it to be from $200 to $70,000; when in fact, the increase was from $2000 to $70,000. In paragraph 4, page 8, she relates the claimants as saying that plaintiff Christopher appeared before Judge Egly in an initial appearance, on January 27, 2016; concerning the Tromblay matter. This was actually the initial appearance of plaintiff Christopher for both the Tromblay AND the Munson matter. He had already bailed out for the Tromblay matter; he was arrested again 3 days later for the Munson matter on January 25th, 2016. The first sentence, then, relates the event of plaintiff Christopher challenging Judge Egly’s jurisdiction here in error, since that challenge occurred during his appearance on the Munson matter; then continues to relate facts following this that concerned the Tromblay matter, which occurred during the same incarcerated time period. After that out of place fact, the rest of the story again unfolds in order; with the only exception being the relation of the fact of the consolidation of cases (as this happened almost immediately after Christopher’s arrest for the Munson case, before the trial for the Tromblay case, not after it; see page 9, paragraph 3).
21. The District Court Judge then passes up entirely NUMEROUS violations of plaintiff Christopher’s rights, these events not mentioned at all include the appointment of Attorney/Defendant Taylor, because of Judge Kelly’s denial of the right of the plaintiff, Christopher, to do things an attorney would be able to do while he was incarcerated and self-represented; basically leaving him, as his ONLY option, the need to HAVE to accept Mr. Taylor as a co-council in order to, for example, get any documents on his cases or view any of the evidence against him. Other critical events include the hearing that Mr. Taylor could not attend, where defendant Blink dismissed over 29 witnesses from testifying (these were all officials and civil servants) on behalf of plaintiff Christopher and dismissed over 200 pieces of filed evidence of the plaintiff’s as ‘Irrelevant’ 3 business days before trial was to commence; as well as denied him to speak at all about the juvenile cases; as such testimony would have alluded to the reasons the Munson case even existed; would have shown those who conspired with Ms. Munson to have her play the victim for what actual reasons; and finally, who was involved in creating this case out of thin air (John P. Sarcone); as this defendant acted solely on the behest of the DCFS offices in Los Angeles; who involved themselves because they didn’t exactly appreciate plaintiff Christopher’s mass emailing of their entire staff of social workers about crimes they were involved in there, two days prior to his arrest. It also states (page 10, paragraph 2) that the right of the plaintiff to speak freely with his wife and his co-council was denied him; when in fact, the plaintiff itemized in his claim that he was not allowed to speak with ANYONE….his stand-by attorney, his wife, witnesses, ANYONE without being recorded, and without the court’s ability to use anything said by the plaintiff in these recorded conversations against the plaintiff in court; while he was incarcerated. If the District Court Judge wishes to state that the plaintiffs have shown NO violations of rights, then she needs to be clear about the material facts that actually WERE stated in their entirety, instead of leaving out those parts of statements of the claimants that clearly show violations of the plaintiff’s rights. Then the judge passes over other relevant facts to the violation of plaintiff Christopher’s rights, such as when defendants Blink, Lane and Taylor deprived the plaintiff, Christopher, of any information pertaining to how he would proceed on probation after his release (because, for an inmate to not sign up on time means a violation of that probation and more jail time), and the purposeful ‘mistake’ of Judge Blink’s in stating the incarcerated time would be 60 days before Christopher’s release to probation. When the plaintiff returned to the jail, this time period then mysteriously turned into 120 days. This matter was, of course, corrected, but only after notice of plaintiff Christopher, and only after filing an immediate request for reconsideration in the form of a letter to Judge Blink filed on the record of the Polk County Court. Important to also note is the absence of the fact relating to the probation office and the reconsideration letter of Judge Blink’s. The letter from the Ames office was sent to plaintiff Christopher AFTER Christopher had sent Judge Blink a letter stating he was moving back to Des Moines (after he was told to leave because of the Des Moines Register’s libelous ‘Terrorist” article issued just prior to jury deliberations) and wished to not do a probation period but do his sentence instead. Also left out is the fact that, a day after this letter, and one day prior to the warrant issued, the plaintiff posted a 2nd letter to Blink on the record of the court, asking him to not issue the warrant, since a court hearing concerning the matter had been set up already BY HIM which concerned the matter of Christopher’s voluntary revocation. Mentioned then, was that, a day more following that 2nd letter, the Judge violated the plaintiff, then issued the warrant anyway, without cause.
22. The District Court judge then, on page 10, paragraph 2, states that “the convictions were tainted by a libelous story in the Defendant’s Des Moines Register that affected the jury verdict,” when it wasn’t “convictions” at all. This story affected the outcome of the more serious of these two cases, that of FECR292312. She then omits all information from the claim relating the judge’s statement concerning this story, that which justified the possibility of a denial for a mistrial, based on defendant Blink’s “admonishment of the jury”, and using this as a legal guarantee against them noticing or hearing about this libelous story and using it to come to an unfavorable verdict against claimant Christopher; using ridiculous logic to back this up, stating that, because he (Blink) told the jury to “not to pay attention to the media”, that they most certainly did not do so. Also omitted is any fact showing the obvious libel of the Des Moines Register/U.S.A. today in their relation of the unverified “facts” of FECR292312, or of any of those facts leading up to it.
23. The District Court Judge then, beginning on page 10, paragraph 4, and continuing on page 11, paragraph 2, in the relation of facts, goes right into the direct encounter of plaintiff Christopher with defendants Newbury Living and Kyle Theis and ignores then entire period prior to this interaction; since relating THOSE facts would put the plaintiff’s rights violations in a better light. Missing is the entire set up to this interaction, where the offices of Newbury Living colluded with Mr. Theis and defendant Elscott to cause the plaintiff to do something that would violate a code of law. Also missing are the relation of the two encounters with OTHER members of the DMPD, where no one said anything that the plaintiff was doing was wrong, even when the plaintiff actually asked the 2nd officer about any possible wrong-doing, in that encounter. Further, the staff and defendant Elscott did not ‘Watch’ plaintiff Christopher leave after he voluntarily did so, as the District Court Judge related in her order, they followed along as he left the area in unison per Mr. Theis instructions, in an effort to entrap the plaintiff by inciting his anger and causing him to violate a disturbance law in some fashion; which could then give defendant Theis cause to arrest plaintiff Christopher; which, of course worked out great for them. More so, the description of the incident leans heavily on the plaintiff committing crimes and being arrested for them, does much in protecting the defendants named in each “fact” related in summary; and does very little to reiterate the STATED FACTS in the claim that show a clear violation of Christopher’s rights by these defending parties, as a lot of the relation of the presiding judge in these facts seems to do; easily justifying the claimants’ feeling a need for appeal in this matter. Finally, on page 11, paragraph 3 of this summary, it mentions that the by now EXTREMELY biased defendant Price then set a cash-only BAIL of $1500 per charge on the 3 misdemeanor charges against the plaintiff in this matter, though mention that these were, in fact, 3 SIMPLE misdemeanor charges, the bail of which should have been somewhere in the neighborhood of around $30 per charge (the bond itself was $300 per charge, and not at all usually cash-only) is not mentioned in the District Court Judge’s relation of facts; since this would CLEARLY show the violation of the plaintiff’s Constitutional rights, both on the Federal AND the State level. These ridiculously high bonds and bails; as well as the high bail set for FECR292312 (in relation to 2 aggravated misdemeanors and a low-level felony) at $70,000 (when it usually would have been at $9,000 at the most) as they were imposed against plaintiff Christopher in both SMAC343617 and FECR292312 are in DIRECT violation of one of the rights referred to in the plaintiff’s claim, a right that guarantees protection of a citizen against the imposition of unreasonable bails, bonds and fines; a right guaranteed the people in general; not only in the U.S. Constitution, but also in the Constitution of the State of Iowa and for that state’s citizens as well.
24. The District Court Judge then refers to the fact that the plaintiff, Christopher “filed a post-conviction relief application, although it is unclear which conviction he challenged.” In the claim, item # 115, subsection “a”, the claimant, Christopher relates, in the claim of damage against defending party Linda Lane, “Ms. Lane did also conspire with Defendant John P. Sarcone to flee from Des Moines and from having to defend her criminal actions, laid out and brought against her in case PCCE080717 by Plaintiff Christopher (in Plaintiff Christopher’s Post-Conviction case, see claim item #’s 116-126,).” Under claim item #120, it states “C.B. claimed that they had ordered an unconstitutionally high bail in the underlying case (FECR292312)”, while the plaintiff’s related facts to the court of the District Court Judge; concerning the post-conviction case referred to. This not only clearly showed the case challenged in PCCE080717; it also clearly shows, both, that the District Court Judge did not take proper judicial notice of the majority of the facts stated in the plaintiff’s claim, and also that she instead chose to skim through the claim and refer to only the facts she chose to read and refer to; in error.
Aaaaaaaaaaand cut. Folks, we're gonna just stop here, and we'll continue on when we finally post the brief, at a later date, probably around the 1st of November...when we put it into the case. When it goes in, America, this is gonna be the pro per brief to end all briefs. Stay tuned. Til Next Time, Eh? Buh bye! :D
