Saturday, October 20, 2018

The Fed Funny Farm, Take 2, Part VI - The Appellate "Brief"



guys....Guys....GUYS!  The "Brief" IS DONE!  Not only a moment too soon, but 17 days and a moment too soon!  These criminals are gonna FLIP...as is the appellate court.  There is, NO WAY...I REPEAT, NO WAY that the appellate courts can find these decisions by the Fed District Court to be anything but MADE IN ERROR!!!

And they'd best get busy writing their replies to this brief...because it is gonna take every brain cell they're in possession of to properly refute it.  America?  I give you....the most brilliant appellate brief to ever hit the record of the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals.  Enjoy!  See you soon with the answers of the criminals, eh?  :D

NOTE:  the ORIGINAL brief was stricken from the record of the court...get this, because it was too long.  I told them that if they had let me format it in 12 point type, with 1" side margins and .75 inch margins top and bottom, it would have only been 42 pages long.  Stupid rules of court.  Anyway, it's OK, because now?  it's perfectly brilliant.  So to all you criminals? PFFFFFFFT!!!

INDEX
I.             SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .PAGES 2-8

II.          DISCUSSION OF ERROR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . PAGES 8-44

III.       ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . PAGES 44-53

IV.        CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .PAGES 53-68



          The claimants the above captioned case, claimant Christopher (Bruce) the living man and Elizabeth (Bruce) the living woman do file this brief in support of our appeal:

I.             SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS

1.     The claimants filed claim (#4:18-cv-40) on 2/12/2018.

2.     The claimants filed motion to proceed In Forma Pauperis on 2/15/2018.  It took the District Court until 4/05/2018; a month and a half, to grant the motion; putting the claimants on a tight schedule to serve the summons on the defendants.  The claimants paid someone to serve summons to the majority of the defendants at their respective law departments.  All other defendants were mailed their summons via certified mail, and each was signed for; indicating that the defendants had all been served.  The claimants find it difficult to understand and accept that a summons can be deemed “not properly served,” according to defendant Katherine Beth Walker, but obviously the same defendant knows the case exists and is claiming improper service; thereby obviously has a copy of the claim and summons.  What more can the claimants provide the court?  The body?  A lock of hair?  The defendant’s fingerprints?  The claimants believe that her denial of proper service should be enough to show she has her copy, and is using the court’s stringent rules of service to get out of her part in it.  And, if Ms. Walker can get out of her part using the District Court Judge’s logic, why couldn’t every other defending party get out of their parts the same way; since the claimants didn’t serve directly on any of the defendant’s actual persons?  Tony Reed’s attorney BEGAN claiming improper service.  Finally, yet even he answered after proof was submitted to the court.  What makes Katherine Walker special?

3.     The State of Iowa, on the date of 5/14, 2018, did file a motion to seal documents filed by them in the case, (that were totally irrelevant to the entirely NEW lawful claims that were alleged by the plaintiffs;) and stated, along with every other defendant in their respective answers almost identically, that the plaintiffs were trying to bring “an appeal from a juvenile case;” a lie and unfounded assumption; since the claims made by the plaintiffs cover over 8 state cases, both Juvenile and criminal.  When they did so, the court granted the order, on the SAME DAY via text order, and sent it to the claimants, IMMEDIATELY.  The claimants replied to this filing; and stated that these documents were filed and sealed in error.  No order from this court has never addressed the claimants’ rebuttal for the need to seal these documents, let alone the need for these documents to be filed in this case at ALL; as this was also rebutted.

4.     On 5/22/2018, Defendant Lucas Taylor, through his attorney Helen C. Adams, motioned the district court for an extension of time to answer the plaintiffs’ claim.  The district court granted this motion ON THE SAME DAY, via Text.

5.     The Court, on 5/31/2018, ordered the plaintiffs to provide proof of service on defendants Katherine Walker and Anthony Reed, so they could either be dismissed, or if service was proved proper, so that they might answer to the claim.  The plaintiffs did so and filed proof of service on 6/6/2018.  The district court did NOTHING, until the day these matters were decided.

6.     Claimant Christopher filed motion to file electronically on 6/6/2018.  Court granted this motion 5 days later.

7.     The claimants motioned the District Court for a permanent injunction against defendant John P. Sarcone, on 6/19/2018, in an attempt to stop him from taking unreasonable actions against plaintiff Christopher performed outside the scope of his official duties.  The County Attorney has been contacting federal Law Enforcement offices across the country, to stop claimant Christopher, from speaking freely, a fact proven by the claimants per filed evidence.  The district court did NOTHING concerning this motion until after petition was filed with the appellate courts for a Writ of Mandamus and the cases were decided.

8.     The plaintiffs then asked the district court to dismiss numerous defendants from “Bruce I” immediately; so the plaintiffs could file a new claim against MOST of the same defendants in their individual capacities (and did so, see 4:18-cv-223;) on 6/20/2018; and the district court did NOTHING concerning this until the day these matters were decided.

9.     After waiting for the district court’s response to the motion to dismiss the defendants and keep others; that motion referenced in item 8 of this section, claimants filed motions to set a schedule for evidentiary and scheduling hearings on 7/13/2018.  The court then denied these motions via Text order within a couple of days, utilizing the absurd and disproved reason that the court had no clear idea, nor were they “able to make a clear determination who the defendants are” in the case at that time, though the defendants motioned to be dismissed and remaining were clearly named in the afore-mentioned motion.

10.The Plaintiffs then, on 7/13/2018, according to their right per the District Court’s rules of Federal Procedure, filed motion for summary judgement and relief sought in part from defendant Katherine Walker and the district court did NOTHING; even though the time for her answer to be filed in this action was well past the original answer date; and far past the date the claimants provided proof of service, per the district court’s request in June of 2018)  Then, Ms. Walker was released in the Judge’s decisions, based SOLELY on improper service.  Until that date, nothing at all concerning this matter, save the order that ordered the claimants to file proof of service for defendant Walker, is even on the record of the court.  This indicates that the District Court Judge has been directly communicating with Defendant Walker ex-parte, off the record.  This is a violation of the plaintiff’s due process rights.

11.The plaintiffs then filed a demand for the district court to take action, in a timely fashion, for the claimants’ motions on the record, on 7/25/18; in accordance with the district court’s own rules of civil procedure; because they addressed all the defending motions immediately.  The court did not ever address this motion.

12.On 7/29/18; the claimants filed a letter on the record, and mailed this letter to the chief justice, Justice Jarvey, asking him if he would address the court’s inaction.  Justice Jarvey also did nothing, in response.

13.The claimants then filed a petition, asking for a Writ of Continuing Mandamus for the 8th Circuit Appellate Court.

14.Upon asking the District Court for their response to the writ (there was a letter in error for the clerk, then a proper one was sent out) the District Court then chose to act on both claims, decided both matters in error within an hour of each other; and dismissed both actions on September 21st, 2018.

II.         Discussion of Error
          The claimants wish to first address the cases separately.  In the first claim, claimants did as they were instructed.  They listed facts in detail and hoped that this would suffice.  They did so in error, obviously, since immediate answers and motions to dismiss followed, all stating that there were no claims of damage made upon which relief could be awarded.  The claimants replied to all of these answers and resisted the motions to dismiss, but decided that, since error had been pointed out so clearly (as well as redundantly, using almost the exact same words and reasons from every defendant’s attorney,) that they would then file a new claim in another suit, that corrected this error; then moved to dismiss those defendants all claiming to be employees of their respective corporate fictions/Government Service Corporations and acting in their official capacities; switched the defending parties to “Individuals” (since one attorney had expressly noted this error in his answer); added more defendants and 14 pages to the claim; added claims of damage; and resubmitted it into case #4:18-cv-223.  Six defendants were asked to be kept (in what the District Court Judge has named “Bruce I”) that had already been named as individuals; but these were also added in the 2nd action (dubbed by her as “Bruce II”) since it and every one in “Bruce I” would obviously be dismissed, as no claims of damage were properly made.  Also important to mention is that the claimants had filed viable evidence in the replies to answers given by the defendants in “Bruce I”; but since reference had been made to the vagueness of the claim (even though it was detailed for 49 pages,) and the court had made it clear it would accept no amendment of the claim, the claimants decided to give the court a massive increase in evidence in “Bruce II;” including court and other documentation in support of the violation of the claimants rights, wholly.  The filing of these exhibits had not been completed as yet, since summons had not even been issued to the claimants in “Bruce II.”  The claimants felt they had time to complete the task; yet “Bruce II” was hurriedly and rashly decided before the summons were even issued.  The exhibits the claimants did get filed (the claimants do not even believe they had finished filing for the entire first year yet; numbering 40 exhibits that we remember), paint a clear picture of the violations of the claimants’ rights; the conspiracy against the claimants’ rights; and served to show the activities engaged in for profit and these activities’ scope and range.  Finally, these exhibits served to show clearly an obvious meeting of the minds between varying defendants at varying times.  The claimants chose to file these additional exhibits to avoid the possibility of dismissal in “Bruce II”; but obviously there was a lot more needed; such as photos, video recordings, bodies, blood and other forensic proof; since papers signed by the defendants and crimes committed by them as they were recorded (i.e., Defendant Nieman’s kidnapping of the claimants’ child) were and are not enough for the district court judge.
         
In their discussion of error, the claimants choose not to address the order concerning “Bruce I”; though reference may be made to it where it applies; as when there is a gap in the logic of the court in 2nd claim’s order; though that gap is wide enough in both orders.

In discussion of the error preserved on the record in both cases, the claimants provide these valid errors:
1.   Leniency was not provided the claimants in their cases.  The claimants are poor and cannot afford proper legal counsel and no council was due to be appointed for them, per the rules of court.  The court, therefore, should have granted leniency; i.e. the option to amend their claim, something it was obvious the court wouldn’t allow.  The claimants will restate for the court that they are NOT ATTORNEYS OF THE BAR, (as stated in their filed affidavits) and, should thereby have been granted extra leniency.

2.   We the claimants begin with a “Standard of Review” of their own, the common defining characteristics of a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 action.  This section leads a plaintiff to believe that the it exists to protect citizens from the violation of their Constitutionally guaranteed rights by those acting in positions of alleged and granted ‘Authority’ over them; while they act in their official capacities, within the scope of their respective everyday duties.  What the District Court has done in issuing these orders is prove; to the claimants and every citizen in America; that no one can bring a successful claim using this section of statute in the District Federal Court without the help of the U.S. Attorney (since several times and concerning several allegations, the court alludes that the claimants “having no standing to bring these allegations” by themselves.) or another attorney.  In the past, the claimants have brought these allegations before the U.S. Attorney in the Southern district of Iowa SEVERAL TIMES in the 4 years prior to these claims (see also the docket of the Federal District Court, which lists other prior “related actions” that were brought by the claimant Christopher on other dates, while he was incarcerated); and have been told by those of that district’s office that there wasn’t an action that could be brought against these officials by the U.S. Attorney located there; concerning these obvious violations of the claimants’ rights.  This proves, to these claimants, that there is no action; per section 1983 or any other section that can or will be brought against those in official capacity on ANY level for ANY reason, since the determination to file charges has been limited to a single (and easily corruptible) official in each district – the respective U.S. Attorney.  It must be this way in order to better protect those of official capacity from having to endure such matters brought by the “children” of the citizenry, as they tend to cry too loudly too often.  It also proves to the claimants and to all Americans that those alleged to be in ‘Authority’ over us can do whatever they want whenever they choose, without possible consequences - whether those actions be felonious, against federal law, or in complete violation of every right allegedly provided all citizens; since almost everyone named has been dismissed with immunities of all types (no matter what the position or level of “Authority;” no matter what the motive, or what level of criminality); have been deemed not under the jurisdiction of the federal district court because they were not properly “served” per the court’s rules; fell outside the State of Iowa’s statute of limitations; were victims of a ‘Threadbare recital of vague and baseless statements,” etc.; or that the claimants had no standing to bring the allegations made.  The claimants would like to point out that every one of the 64 collective defendants in both claims ALL had at least one way to skirt the claims of the plaintiffs; without fail and with the nod of the District Court Judge and with barely any effort; even defendants that were added in the 2nd claim who didn’t even know about that claim at all.  The claimants add that the summons to ‘Bruce II’ weren’t even issued yet to the claimants to be served at the time of the order deciding “Bruce II”; meaning, again, that neither the added defendants or those repeated defendants even knew this claim existed nor had they even read that claim.  How can the matter be ruled on if none that were defendants even knew that this claim existed?  This new claim had claims of damage added.  There were 14 added pages.  Tens of new exhibits were filed, and over 100 more were still to be filed.  How can the judge of the District Court properly make an informed decision in “Bruce II” on the same day, using pretty much the same order?  This alone is a grave error of the District Court.  The claimants ask this court to consider the possibility that the District Court, located in Des Moines, Iowa, has obviously conspired with those of the County and State that they’re both located in; in order to help the defendants get these matters buried once and for all before they can do any real damage.  To allow even one defendant to remain in these matters, or should the plaintiffs succeed in receiving any of their due justice or relief, would invariably serve to prove other wrongs done the claimants by other defendants (in that one action of any listed defendant leads unerringly to other criminal actions and defendants named herein; whether the additional actions were made by the same or other defendants); and further shows the obvious bias of the district court in favor of those elected officials this claim primarily accuses of wrong-doing.  The claimants wish to show another side to this reasoning, by asking this question:  If 42 U.S.C. 1983 isn’t for the purpose that it states that it is, or doesn’t apply to ANY of the defendants in either of the claimants’ actions; or doesn’t address Constitutional violations of the rights of citizens or the claimants, then what is its purpose, and who DOES it apply to, if not the defendants and the claimants listed?  The claimants have given the District Federal Court a variety of defendants from different walks of life, in quite a variety of elected offices on every level; city, state, county, and appellate; and others who were not acting officially at all.  Who does this action apply to, and who does it protect, if it doesn’t protect these claimants from damage inflicted by every one of the defendants?  Finally, is it the intent of the order by the District Court to say that violating a citizen’s rights is OK as long as it’s done in the course of the defendant’s job, and that crimes engaged in, that can be freely committed by them without consequence against the claimants and others (the claimants define “crime” to mean criminal actions that, when executed by the citizens of this country, would land them in jail or prison; for a long time) while performing those duties (some that are obviously not “duties” that could be construed as “Part of their job”) are no big deal?   If they are saying this, then it is this court’s moral and Constitutional duty to find the District Court in grave error based on only the answer to these questions.

3.   The claimants also argue that, when it was ruled that “because there is no statute of limitations made in the federal statute concerning a 1983 action, that state law concerning those matters applies instead.”  More so, a defense is used that, since these matters are already decided in Iowa Courts of law, that these matters are all “Res Ajudicata” and this trumps anything the claimants are asking the Federal Courts to do for them, concerning their requested relief.  The claimants, thereby ask that the federal appellate court answer these questions, presented by the claimants.  First, should State law say that Marijuana is legal, but then, a federal DEA agent comes in and says, marijuana is still illegal, per federal statute, and arrests the perpetrator - Who wins?  The answer is obvious – The Federal Government trumps the several States in matters of the law.  Then why is this different in this case?  How is it that matters of the state can trump federal law?  Is not the SCOTUS the law of the land?  Do not the words of the SCOTUS outweigh those of the State Supreme Courts, in order of legal weight in already decided matters, when new ones come before the federal courts?  Do not the words of the SCOTUS outweigh ALL legal arguments?  Then why should anything spoken by or decided of the State courts matter, when they come before, say, the Appellate Courts of the Federal Government, or before even the Federal District Courts?  And yet, when it is convenient for those in office, all of a sudden, everything the State has ruled outweighs the Supreme Court of the United States; the “Law of the Land”?  The Claimants, quite simply, smell a rat; and a dead one at that.  Jurisdiction of the Federal government obviously applies here, and is proven, (since the federal court Judge has made her ruling over BOTH matters) thereby, anything presented in relation to “Res Ajudicata” DOES NOT AND SHOULD NOT APPLY IN THESE MATTERS.  These are NEW CLAIMS, and nothing decided in the past in any state court MATTERS AT ALL in these claims.  Second; how is it that the Statute of Limitations can be set by the several states, in relation to a statute of FEDERAL LAW?  Who is it that is really in charge here?  Do we live in a country of 51 countries, or are we a united country of 50 segments; who are all under the Governance of the United States Federal Government??  If the Federal Government has not imposed a Statute of Limitations in a Section 42 U.S.C. 1983 matter, then there should be none…period.  This is a federal statute; so let the federal government set the limits on it.  Should these statutes and their limitations be set by the several states, then there should be no federal code at all.  Finally, the Federal Government and its judiciary should be the last word in deciding if the actions of a state are too corrupted to be considered legally proper.  Is it the intention of this federal District Judge to put forth to the claimants that, since a corrupt state court ruled, for instance, that the nationally recognized LEGAL AND PROPER FATHER of the child in question, that child that was asked to be returned to the lawful parents without fail as relief; was ruled by the State of Iowa to be a non-father with NO PARENTAL RIGHTS TO START WITH, then anything the federal government says following this corrupt and empty legal decision doesn’t matter??   If the Federal Government has no power; and State Courts can run through the fields legally naked, willy-nilly, with no consequences, then why do we need federal courts, federal laws and; most importantly; why do we need the Federal Government and its alleged authority…AT ALL?  Obviously, the States rule last in all matters, so then those of this court and the SCOTUS may as well pack up, collect your remaining pay and clock out.  We evidently don’t need you anymore, since you obviously have no decision, weight or power that you can produce or have that super-cedes those of the courts of the several states; and their decisions, weight or power.

4.   As to the relation and summary of the facts that were deemed to be facts by the District Court Judge in charge of the case (per the order), the claimants intend to address each of the condensed and summarized ‘Facts”, what is missing (per show of claims of damage) and intend to show how what is missing does in fact apply to the plaintiffs’ claims and desired relief.  The plaintiffs will only address the actual claims of damage and relate their item numbers in doing so:


a.   Per summary of relevant facts, page 2, paragraph 1, it addresses the claim of damage concerning defendant Nieman.  In it, it states, as fact, that the claimants were visited by Ms. Nieman (at which time Ms. Nieman would lead the claimants to believe everything was fine, and the case would be considered to be “unfounded” and the caller would be considered as acting vindictively in her report of the claimants.  Then Ms. Nieman returned the next morning, while the father was absent; to take both the mother and the child to an unannounced medical appointment at Methodist Hospital, with a pre-arranged group of doctors; an “appointment” that eventually turned into a “mandatory” 72 hour stay to observe them both; also without the claimant’s consent or knowledge.  It then states that Ms. Nieman arranged to have the child, T.B., removed from the mother’s care.  It doesn’t address missing allegations of conspiracy, in that Ms. Nieman pre-arranged the stay of T.B. and plaintiff Elizabeth with the Doctors and the hospital beforehand, that she told them that she wished to alter the reports of the doctors to show the child needed to be removed; neither does it state that plaintiff Elizabeth was forced to remain at the hospital the entire weekend; without her knowledge and without her consent.  The child was also checked into the hospital under the same non-related pretense, also without the mother’s knowledge or her consent.  The Child protective assessment only succeeded because the worker lied 55 plus times about the claimants, and that the allegations that were originally made were all discarded for new and fabricated ones and were all based on a single call made by a psychotic woman on her way out of state, who was mad at the claimants for evicting her from their home.  DHS only spoke with the woman once; and weren’t able to verify, prove or charge any of these accusations at any time during either case.  After this forced stay, the worker then returned to bully the plaintiff, Elizabeth, into signing a document stating that she consented to the removal of her child into the care of the Department of Human Services, and Ms. Nieman.  She forged the mother’s initials into the document where the plaintiff was supposed to sign them, showing that she had read the document, and understood what was happening.  The plaintiffs provided the court with an audio recorded copy of the entire unlawful removal; and if nothing else, the recording shows that plaintiff, Elizabeth, was not given a choice to sign this document; she was forced into signing it, using Ms. Nieman’s deception and legal duress.  More so, the other claimant (the “legal father” wasn’t present to give his “consent”, though he had all right to be.  It also totally discludes all mention of the obvious intent to fake the Polk County and State of Iowa’s jurisdiction over the claimants and their newborn daughter; when they deprived the mother, through the act of falsifying plaintiff Elizabeth’s answer to a very important question about the mother’s possible Native American heritage; thereby depriving the mother wholly of the possibility of a different jurisdiction over them both; for over 5 months.  Also missing is the fact that, per Iowa Statute, “reasonable efforts” were to be taken, as well as listed prior to this removal, to possibly prevent or eliminate the need for the removal.  None were listed, and defendant William A. Price, acting as alleged ‘judge’, in his official capacity, then allegedly signed this order (we believe we have undisputable proof showing the worker also forged the Judge’s signature on this order as well; an act we do not put past her, considering the dishonest behavior we have already proved), also validating that these non-existing efforts had indeed occurred.  Finally, per the recording and the form, only a very small portion of the entire order was read to the plaintiff, Elizabeth, and none of the lines that were read gave plaintiff Elizabeth even a half of an inkling what was going on and why, or her rights in this case.  Elizabeth; though she did herself sign the order, did not check any of the boxes saying she had read and understood the form; and this is evident, since on the recording, it is Ms, Nieman reading to Elizabeth only the things she wants her to hear, obviously only half or less of what is stated and asked in the form; meaning Elizabeth wasn’t allowed to read any of it; nor was she given a chance to.

b.   Next, the judge lights on the “irregularities” of the petition (see damage claim pertaining to Polk County Assistant Stephanie Brown; and relation of ‘Summary of Facts, page 2, paragraph 4), and summarizes the allegations made against her with one sentence, referring to the entirety of the damaged claimed by saying “the court, DHS, the county attorney’s office AND our own lawyers were working in concert against us;” using one sentence of our entire group of allegations and ignoring the rest (Id. Claim #20.)  Then, while referring to the conspiracy portion of the plaintiff’s claim against Ms. Brown, the District Court Judge only mentions a single sentence as well, and misses the majority of the wrongful actions taken by Ms. Brown against the claimants, such as her forgery of the claimants’ signatures on the forms that were filed, forms we had allegedly signed, stating that we had received the petition for removal; when we didn’t receive a copy of that petition until September 12th, 2014, the date of the adjudication hearing, nearly a month later.  These are most serious depravations of due process.

c.    Skipping all that happened between the removal and the adjudication hearing (such as the first drug test tampering, the removal hearing, etc.); the judge moves immediately on to a single claim made against attorney/defendant Mays (summary of facts, page 3, paragraph 2); mentioning only the infraction that Mays had the plaintiff, Elizabeth, file a 2nd financial affidavit a month and a half after the first went into effect; so as to portray her as having income with no expenses.  This is, according to the plaintiffs, just one of a dozen or more of Mr. Mays’ listed infractions…and absolutely none of the others are mentioned in the order, nor are any claims or allegations even used which could possibly show, blatantly no less, any and all of the violations of the plaintiffs’ rights by defendant Mays.

d.   Then the District Court Judge goes on to say, in the relation of facts (page 3, paragraph 3, summary of facts), that the termination of parental rights hearing was held on September 12th, 2014.  This was the date of the adjudication hearing, not the termination hearing.  She then refers to when claimant Christopher was locked out from seeing documents filed by the prosecution (summary of facts, page 3, paragraph 4), a violation of the plaintiff’s due process rights, one that continued on past that date for well over a month and a half.  Then, numerous, pertinent and relevant claim items are passed by in abundance.

e.   The District Court Judge then refers directly to the claim concerning the termination hearing, and states that the parental rights were terminated (see page 5, paragraph 1).  She does not refer to the fact that the biological father’s rights were initially slated to be terminated, then changed to giving the child to him free of all responsibility; as defendant Price and Attorney/Defendant Walker decided to work together to FURTHER violate the claimants’ rights; does not mention the removal of the father as an interested party of the case both illegally and unlawfully; makes no referral to the claimants’ motion for intervention of the Cherokee tribe in the case at THIS time period, when the case was nearly over (something the claimants finally realized they could do, after Ms. Nieman deprived them of that possibility from the beginning by falsifying the removal form and the record with her affidavit, stating that that neither Elizabeth nor her daughter T.B. had any ties to any tribe), discards entirely the vindictive disregard of plaintiff Elizabeth’s motion related to her rescindment of all signatures on all documents she had signed to date; not only once, but TWICE; or granting of permanency of T.B. by Defendant Price to the biological father, R.S., though R.S. had not been at all involved in either juvenile case up to and including that date, had no interest in the child at all; nor did he even know he had a child, didn’t know that plaintiff Elizabeth had been pregnant, had given birth to T.B., or that she had been alive for an additional 6 months past THAT time, until DHS hunted him down.

f.     In the paragraph that follows, the District Court Judge then refers to the instance of claim made, referring to actions taken by Mrs. Rhinehart (summary of facts, page 3, paragraph 5), actions that inadvertently threatened the Claimant Christopher’s first amendment rights, and this is clearly stated in the claim.  The District Court Judge also refers to an incorrect fact that states (page 3, paragraph 5) “Defendant Stephanie Rhinehart informed Christopher Bruce in a telephone message he would not be allowed to visit T.B. unless he stopped writing about the termination proceedings in his blog.”  The termination hearing didn’t occur for another 4 months.  Defendant Rhinehart threatened the claimant Christopher with the deprival of his visits with his daughter, if he did not stop writing on his blog about ANY events that were occurring.  Christopher hasn’t seen his daughter since 9/24/14.

g.   A host of claim items; pointing to and proving violations of both the claimants’ rights are then completely passed over without comment.  These are related events that occurred between the time of the adjudication hearing and the termination hearing.  These include the ATTEMPTED conspiracy to have plaintiff Christopher arrested for harassment of his active visitation supervisor and caseworker Katie Gosch (this was foiled when Christopher produced a mountain of evidence to the contrary); all the events that occurred at the permanency hearing, which contained the most harmful and vindictive violations of the claimants’ rights than all else combined.  Not mentioned are the dispositional hearing, and two hearings that were held in December 2014, hearings held to allegedly “hear” motions that had been filed by the claimants; the 2nd continued one being one that included a PROVEN 2nd falsification of their drug test results.  These events occurred long before the termination hearing ALLEGEDLY took place.  These aren’t even addressed in passing in this judge’s order.


h.   The District Court Judge goes on to say (on page 4, paragraph 1, summary of facts), that the claimants had claimed the termination of parental rights hearing to be ‘fraught with error.’  The claimants do not even allude to this fact, they CLAIM that this hearing did not take place, AT ALL.  They claim error, not because of decisions made in it, but because this hearing never happened.  Nobody listed as being in it or transcribing it were even there…including the claimants themselves, since the defendants involved, in collusion, had smartly waylaid the claimants with a surprise warrant for claimant Christopher’s arrest for non-existing crimes, one week before the termination hearing.

i.     Following this (summary of facts, page 4, paragraph 2), the District Court Judge refers to the incident involving the Des Moines Police Department’s Jake Lancaster, DHS employees Gosch and Rhinehart, and the County Attorney’s offices, as they conspired together and produced non-existing charges with no filed proof of these crimes; exactly a week prior to the termination hearing, charges using weakly chargeable and TRANSCRIBED/FILED statements left for defending parties Nieman and Gosch on their answering machines by the claimant, Christopher; in support of the charged ‘crimes’ ; and events that had occurred (and, as they apply, had also NOT occurred at all) almost 2 months prior to the charges being filed; when the claimant, Christopher, called them both – on the weekend, at night, when the claimant knew neither would answer, absolutely.  Claimant Christopher didn’t even speak to these workers.  NO THREATS WERE MADE, with the possible exception of when the claimant said “Enjoy your job, because it’s about over.”  The District Judge totally omits all matters concerning the methods used to hunt plaintiff Christopher down against all logic; almost a full month after the termination hearing; and neglects to refer to the fact of the County Attorney’s office calling the President’s own Secret Service in order to affect Christopher’s arrest for these non-existing  crimes; nor does the judge say anything in summary about the continuous libel and slander that occurred (and still occurs TO THIS DAY) without reasonable cause; abounding on every webpage, TV Station and Newspaper in the Des Moines and surrounding areas; as Mr. Lancaster went insanely above and beyond all duties required of him as a city police detective to ensure the utter decimation of the character of the plaintiff (by placing the plaintiff, Christopher,  from day one, into the #1 MOST wanted criminal position for “harassing” social workers, ahead of murderers and felons, for over a month.)  Christopher plead quickly to the 2 simple misdemeanors so he could get back home; the other was completely dropped against him (the false aggravated misdemeanor.)  The District Court Judge hides these allegations well behind a ‘conclusory’ statement, saying (quoting the plaintiffs here) “the defendants involved, Price, The DHS, and all at the county attorney’s offices (including and ESPECIALLY {Defendant} assistant County Attorney Kevin J. Brownell) conspired together to make sure T.B. went somewhere, ANYWHERE and to ANYONE as long as no one gave her back to” the plaintiffs.” in her reference to the single statement in the one portion of the claim made about these events (even though there were QUANTITIES of statements of damage made in the claim; concerning this and numerous other matters.

j.     On page 5, paragraph 3 (summary of facts), the District Court Judge refers to the appeal to the termination of parental rights and states the dates it was held as July 5-6, 2015; although these are the dates of the Child Protective Assessment appeal, in front of the ALJ at DHS.   The plaintiffs know why this appeal isn’t mentioned or detailed in any way, since it was this appeal that the removing entity THEMSELVES claimed the Child Protective Assessment to be “Unfounded” and in error, then, upon the State’s appeal up to the director of DHS, he ALSO ruled these findings of the ALJ as AFFIRMED (meaning, of course, that wrong was done these claimants and the child shouldn’t have EVER been removed in the first place – and, in effect, also showed that all the District Courts of Polk County had kidnapped their child for no reason, deprived them of the possibility of tribal intervention for all of two juvenile cases, then terminated their unalienable right to parent;  was also IN ERROR.)  She then talks of assistant AG Katherine Miller-Todd (who was in no way involved in this appeal), mixed in with facts from the Iowa Supreme Court appellate appeal concerning the claimant’s termination of parental rights (which was heard almost a year later, and not mentioned in this portion of the claim); and the hearing appealing the Child Protective Assessment.

k.   The District Court Judge then covers the fabricated Termination hearing and its false transcripts (summary of facts, page 6, paragraph 1) and says that the claimants state error and irregularities in this appeal’s order from the Iowa Supreme Court as well; a fact agreed to vehemently by the claimants.  The judge then relates and states that the Supreme Court held that claimant Christopher had no parental rights to terminate; although he began as a LEGAL FATHER.  How then can he have no parental rights; according to anyone?  What is the definition, then, of a legal father, and where did this term come from?  The Supreme Court HAD to state this, in order to justify plaintiff Christopher’s illegal removal from the case as the LEGAL parent; who was married to the claimant, ELIZABETH at the time of the birth of T.B.; and a party of interest in T .B.; an order of the district court below it in MASSIVE error; so as to assist in justifying defendant Price’s right to then toss Christopher and his damning motions and evidence out of the case along with him; by ‘establishing paternity’ in the case in favor of R.S., the biological SPERM DONOR; something it’s understood, generally, in the realm of law, as not needing to be done, since there was already a ‘legal father’, complete with all the necessary rights he most certainly had, since the law ITSELF provides him that; in position ( i.e., plaintiff Christopher.)  So let’s get this straight…if the world recognizes plaintiff Christopher as a LEGAL FATHER, WITH RIGHTS…but the State of Iowa says he never had any rights to terminate and defines the term differently, then it is so?  This is, quite simply, the most ridiculous legal ruling…ANYWHERE; and everyone is defending this as proper and LEGALLY BINDING???  The plaintiff, Christopher, will personally spit in the face of any one additional judge that says so.

l.     Following all that occurred at the time of termination, the District Court Judge then skips all events that show violations of plaintiff Christopher’s rights; where he was arrested for the false charges that had been brought by the two Iowa DHS workers; and when he couldn’t be found to be arrested, was then arrested by the Secret Service, after John P. Sarcone’s offices involved them and even after they had already accomplished what they wanted, the claimants to miss their termination hearing; and facts that show that this arrest was followed out to its completion, vindictively, evidently in order to teach the claimant Christopher additional lessons; such as ‘We can do whatever we want to whoever we want.  The District Court Judge totally missed including all the facts and evidence that showed how Ms. Nieman had collaborated with the County Attorney’s offices to have claimant Christopher arrested; using such evidence we had already filed in “Bruce I AND II”; such as the FILED state’s transcripts of the original statements made by the plaintiff, Christopher to the 2 alleged social workers, the alleged “Victims” (these were never filed in the criminal case, because to do so would have shown the charges to be fabricated; the actual statements were filed in both our juvenile cases two months prior, just after the incident); the motion that asked the court to drop the 1st degree harassment JUST BEFORE trial; the filing of the Victim Impact Statement of Ms. Nieman’s WELL AFTER the case was closed and dismissed.  There was, at no time, a Victim Impact Statement filed on behalf of Ms. Gosch, DHS’ other ‘victim’.

m. The ruling District Court Judge then (page 8, paragraph 2) refers to the bond amount increase in FECR292312; and states it to be from $200 to $70,000; though the increase was from $2000 to $70,000.  In paragraph 4, page 8, she states “plaintiff Christopher appeared before Judge Egly in an initial appearance, on January 27, 2016; concerning the Tromblay matter.”  This was actually the initial appearance for the Munson matter.  Christopher had already bailed out for the Tromblay matter; he was arrested again 3 days later for the Munson matter on January 25th, 2016.  The first sentence relates the event of plaintiff Christopher challenging Judge Egly’s jurisdiction here in error, since that challenge occurred during his appearance on the Munson matter; then relates facts following this that concerned the Tromblay matter, which occurred during the same time period.  After this, the rest of the story again unfolds in order; with the only exception being the consolidation of cases (as this happened almost immediately after Christopher’s arrest for the Munson case, before the trial for the Tromblay case, not after it; see page 9, paragraph 3).

n.   The District Court Judge then passes up entirely NUMEROUS violations of plaintiff Christopher’s rights, these events included the appointment of Attorney/Defendant Taylor, because of Judge Kelly’s denial of the right of the plaintiff, Christopher, to do things an attorney would be able to do while he was incarcerated and self-represented; basically leaving him, as his ONLY option, to HAVE to accept Mr. Taylor as a co-council in order to, for example, get any documents on his cases or view any of the evidence against him.  Other events include the hearing that Mr. Taylor, conveniently, “could not attend,” where defendant Blink dismissed over 29 witnesses from testifying (these were all officials and civil servants) on behalf of plaintiff Christopher and dismissed over 200 pieces of filed evidence of the plaintiff’s as ‘Irrelevant’ 3 business days before trial; and denied him to speak at all about the juvenile cases; as such testimony would have alluded to the reasons the Munson case even existed; would have shown those who conspired with Ms. Munson to have her play the victim for what actual reasons; and finally, who was involved in creating this case out of nothing (John P. Sarcone); as this defendant acted solely on the behest of the DCFS offices in Los Angeles; who involved themselves because they didn’t appreciate plaintiff Christopher’s mass emailing of their staff of social workers about crimes they were involved in two days prior to his arrest.  It also states (page 10, paragraph 2) that the right of the plaintiff to speak freely with his wife and his co-council was denied him; yet the plaintiff related that he was not allowed to speak with ANYONE….his stand-by attorney, his wife, witnesses, ANYONE without being recorded, and without the court’s ability to use anything said by him in these recorded conversations against him in court; while he was incarcerated.  If the District Court Judge states that the plaintiffs have shown NO violations of rights, then she needs to be clear about the material facts that actually WERE stated, in their entirety, instead of leaving out those parts of statements of the claimants that clearly show violations of the plaintiff’s rights.  Then the judge passes over other relevant facts to the violation of plaintiff Christopher’s rights, such as Blink, Lane and Taylor depriving the plaintiff, Christopher, of any information that told him how he would proceed on probation after his release, and the purposeful ‘mistake’ of defendant Blink’s; in stating the incarcerated time would be 60 days before Christopher’s release to probation; and when the plaintiff returned to the jail, this time period turned into 120 days.  This matter was, of course, corrected, but only after notice of plaintiff Christopher, and only after he filed an immediate request for reconsideration in a letter to defendant Blink, filed on the record of the Polk County Court.  Also passed are the facts of the probation office and the 2ND reconsideration letter to defendant Blink.  The letter from the Ames office was sent to plaintiff Christopher AFTER Christopher had sent Judge Blink a letter stating he was moving back to Des Moines and he wished to not do a probation period but do his sentence instead.  Also left out is that, one day prior to the warrant issued, the plaintiff posted a 2nd letter to Blink on the record of the court, asking him to not issue the warrant, since Blink had already set up a hearing which concerned the matter of Christopher’s voluntary revocation.  Not mentioned, either, is that the day following that 2nd letter, Blink issued the warrant anyway, without cause.

o.   The District Court judge then, on page 10, paragraph 2, states that “the convictions were tainted by a libelous story in the Defendant’s Des Moines Register that affected the jury verdict,” when it wasn’t “convictions”.  This story affected the outcome of the more serious of these two cases, that of FECR292312.  Also omitted are all facts showing the obvious libel of the Des Moines Register/U.S.A. today in their publishing of the unverified and incorrect “facts” of FECR292312.

p.   The District Court Judge then, beginning on page 10, paragraph 4, and continuing on page 11, paragraph 2, goes right into the encounter of plaintiff Christopher with defendant Theis and ignores the period prior to this interaction.  Missing is the entire set up to this interaction, where Defendant Newbury Living colluded with defendants Theis and Elscott to cause the plaintiff to do something that would violate a statute.  Also missing are the two encounters with OTHER officers of the DMPD, where no one said anything that the plaintiff was doing was wrong, even when the plaintiff actually asked the 2nd officer about any possible wrong-doing, and he said there wasn’t any.  Further, the staff and defendant Elscott did not “Watch plaintiff Christopher leave after he voluntarily did so,” they followed along as he left the area in unison per Mr. Theis instructions, to entrap the plaintiff by inciting his anger and causing him to violate a disturbance law; which could then give defendant Theis cause to arrest plaintiff Christopher.  The description of the incident by the judge does very little to reiterate STATED FACTS in the claim that show clear violations of Christopher’s rights by these defending parties, as the presiding judge does often.  Finally, on page 11, paragraph 3 of this summary, it mentions that the EXTREMELY biased defendant, Price, then set a cash-only BAIL of $1500 per charge on the 3 misdemeanor charges against the plaintiff in this matter, though mention that these were 3 SIMPLE misdemeanor charges, the bail of which should have been somewhere around $30 per charge (the bond itself was $300 per charge, and not usually cash-only) is not mentioned in the District Court Judge’s order; since this would CLEARLY show the violation of the plaintiff’s Constitutional rights, both on the Federal AND the State level.  These high bails; and the high bail set for FECR292312 (for 2 aggravated misdemeanors and a low-level felony) at $70,000 (when it should have been $9,000) as they were imposed against plaintiff Christopher in both SMAC343617 and FECR292312 are in DIRECT violation of one of the rights referred to in the plaintiff’s claim, that which guarantees protection of a citizen against the imposition of unreasonably high bails, bonds and fines; a right guaranteed the people - not only in the U.S. Constitution, but also in the Constitution of the State of Iowa, for those state’s citizens as well.

q.   The District Court Judge then refers to the fact that the plaintiff, Christopher “filed a post-conviction relief application, although it is unclear which conviction he challenged.”  Under claim item #120, it states “C.B. claimed that they had ordered an unconstitutionally high bail in the underlying case (FECR292312)”  This not only showed the case challenged in PCCE080717; it also shows, both, that the District Court Judge did not take proper judicial notice of the majority of the facts stated in the plaintiff’s claim, and that she chose to skim through the claim and refer to only the facts she chose to read and refer to.

The claimants now stop with these errors; because it should be apparent that the District Court Judge did NOT address the claims with any sort of accuracy, did not read or address a majority of either of these claims; and ruled on them in error.

III. Argument

The plaintiffs in this matter choose, primarily, not to argue these matters, since argument is made throughout the entirety of this brief.  Therefore, the claimants wish, at this time, merely to remind the court of all decisions ruled by the SCOTUS concerning matters of parents and their children over the years, as they did in their petition of appeal to the Supreme Court of Iowa.

The SCOTUS has ruled thusly:

1.   This was a 4th Amendment (unlawful seizure) and 14th Amendments violation (due process). This constitutional violation was recognized in a ruling from the 9th Circuit pertaining to CPS investigation tactics found to violate civil rights. Greene v Camreta, (9th Cir.)   (Heard in 2009 and 2011).  9th Circuit civil rights case from Oregon holding common CPS investigation tactics to be unconstitutional under either the 4th or 14th Amendment.

a.     Social worker lying to get an emergency removal order. The claimed lie was about the mother's willingness to find another place for husband to live. This was a 4th Amendment (unlawful seizure) and 14th Amendments violation (due process).

2.   Issue:  Did the Court err in its failure to grant a hearing and give full consideration of the nunc pro tunc to answer the purposes of justice by proper analysis of the due process claim?

Standard of Review and Preservation of Error.  Error has been preserved.
a.   Standard of Review

1.)  This court reviews challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for corrections of errors at law.  State v. Yeo, 659 N.W.2d 544, 547.

Error has been preserved. (See State v. Yaw, 398 N.W.2d 803, 805 (Iowa 1987.))
b.    Routing Statement:

2.)  Per Iowa R. app. P.6.14(1)(e), this case would be appropriate for consideration by the Iowa Court of Appeals as it involves applying existing legal principles.  Iowa R. app., P.6.401(3)(b).

3.   The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that: “[T]he custody, care and nurture of the child [should] reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.” (Meyer v. Nebraska)
The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
The Supreme Court has specifically recognized parental rights of custody and control.  In the landmark decision of Meyer v. Nebraska, closely followed by Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court stated that parents have a substantive due process right to "bring up children." These cases have withstood the test of time. Indeed, Justice Brennan has remarked of Meyer and its progeny: "I think I am safe in saying that no one doubts the wisdom or validity of those decisions." The precedents Meyer and Pierce generated have further solidified the principle that parents should have the predominant role in raising their children.  The principle enunciated by Meyer and Pierce, that parents have the right to direct the upbringing and education of their children, has survived the many turbulent changes of the last several decades.
In Meyer, the Supreme Court held that the right of parents to raise their children free from unreasonable state interferences is one of the unwritten "liberties" protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court recognized that the parents enjoy a "well recognized liberty interest in rearing and educating their children in accord with their own views..." including "the right to regulate their children's sexual behavior as best they can..." The protection of parental rights should not have to be achieved on a piecemeal basis through unpredictable and expensive court challenges. The constitutional mandate articulated by Meyer and its progeny is clear:

“The right of parents to direct the upbringing and education of their children shall not be infringed.”.
4.  Two years after Meyer, the Supreme Court in Pierce made clear that the constitutional rights of a parent are not limited to physical custody, but that parents possess the right to direct their child's "destiny." Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
5.  Twenty years after Pierce, the Supreme Court in Prince v. Massachusetts stated that: "[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.

6.    The Supreme Court, in Parham v. J.R, emphasized that simply "because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or officer of the state.  (Emphasis added.)  More recently, in the prominent case of Santosky v. Kramer, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty" and stated that natural parents have a "fundamental liberty interest...in the care, custody, and management of their child.”
7.  Similarly, in Bowen v. American Hospital Ass'n, the Supreme Court recognized "a presumption...that parents are the appropriate decision maker for their infants."
8.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said it best, “The government’s interest in the welfare of children embraces not only protecting children from physical abuse, but also protecting children’s interest in the privacy and dignity of their homes and in the lawfully exercised authority of their parents.” Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1999).
9.  State employees who withhold a child from her family infringe on the family’s liberty of familial association. K.H. through Murphy v. Morgan, 7th Cir. (1990)

10.         The forced separation of parent from child, even for a short time, represents a serious infringement upon the rights of both. J.B. v. Washington County, 10th Cir. (1997)

11.         Parent's interest is of "the highest order." And the court recognizes "the vital importance of curbing overzealous suspicion and intervention on the part of health care professionals and government officials." Thomason v. Scan Volunteer Services, Inc., 8th Cir. (1996)

12.         A State employee who withholds a child from her family may infringe on the family’s liberty of familial association. Social workers could not deliberately remove children from their parents and place them with foster caregivers when the officials reasonably should have known such an action would cause harm to the child’s mental or physical health. K.H. through Murphy v. Morgan (7th Cir. 1990)

In order to conclude point the first, as well as the other two points promised; what more needs to be said?  The removing agency themselves cleared the claimants of all wrongdoing, expunged their records, and removed them from their wrongful place on the Iowa Abuse Registry.  Upon appeal by the Attorney General in charge, Defendant Grant Dugdale, the Director of the removing agency, Charles Palmer, AFFIRMED those decisions, made by the ALJ of the DHS.  Again, what more needs to be said?  Since the child was not abused, and the report that said so ruled to be unfounded, the child should have been IMMEDIATELY returned to the lawful parents, without fail and with full apologies.  The fact that she was not, should convince this court unwaveringly all wrongs done these claimants in every day that has followed the removal of their daughter, along with every flagrant violation of each and every right that has occurred during the course of 4 years.  These are, in fact, 4 years worth of absolute and unnecessary torture.  Relief and justice should have been granted to these claimants ages ago; as well as CLOSURE in these matters; and closure and relief has been continually and unerringly DENIED them at all turns.  T.B. SHOULD BE ORDERED RETURNED TO HER PARENTS IMMEDIATELY IF NOTHING ELSE, and All immunities claimed by these defending parties should. expeditiously and absolutely, be denied them; as they have obviously operated OUTSIDE of the scope of their duties, and have maliciously violated each and every available and protected civil, due process and Constitutionally guaranteed right these claimants have in doing so.  The claimants ask this court to do its moral and civic duty and proceed in filing charges of the crimes alleged, in whatever way is possible.  Argument is concluded at this time.

III.       Conclusion

In conclusion, there is good reason the plaintiffs’ claim of damage is over 64 pages long - because it has to be.  This is not only for the purpose of relating, in full detail, all the crimes and violations of their rights as they have occurred and still do against both the claimants over a long 4-year period; but also so as to not deprive the court of a single detail that might be relevant to the violations of those rights.  The plaintiffs wanted to ensure that District Court wouldn’t be inclined to label the allegations made as “Threadbare” or “Conclusory.” The claimants NEVER intended the short version of events (yes, the 64 page claim is the SHORT version) to be further nut-shelled down by the District Court Judge; who, because she wasn’t present for any of these events, somehow decided to select from those parts of the claim she felt wouldn’t hold water; and omitted what she felt wasn’t necessary (we the claimants accuse that this was done with extreme bias in favor of ALL the defendants; in order to protect her friends in the judiciary and in office in Iowa); with no right or ability to do so (since she knew nothing of the TRUE facts, only those conspiratorial lies given the court falsely by the defendants; those answers very nearly being obviously scripted, rehearsed, and stated by the defendants in unison.  These are believed by the District Court Judge instead; because, evidently, even the most criminal person among us, when in office, couldn’t possibly lie or engage in anything that could be construed criminally…right?)

Every fact related by the claimants is relevant to another, and also relevant to each defendant claimed against; and furthermore, each and every fact lends absolute credence to the plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy against their rights; and of these same defendants’ RICO activities.  The claimants, therefore, contend that the entire order was made by the Federal District Court - in both cases at the same exact time - in error; since the two claims (and, the two cases) are distinctly different in a number of ways.  The 2nd contains more defendants, names the repeated defendants from the first claim to now be individuals; omits their respective offices of ‘Government’ and ‘Authority’ as listed defending parties; contains over 16 more pages of addressed allegations; states claims of damage against each defendant successfully (since the claim from the first claim failed to state claims of damage upon which relief could be granted; as the attorneys representing the defendants hastily and identically pointed out in their answers).  How is the 2nd claim’s order able to state all of these matters as ‘Fully litigated’ and ‘identical’ when it is held up against the first case’s claim, since, at the very minimum, a third of the 2nd claim’s list of defendants are completely different, let alone are there added and clear claims of damage, additional facts and evidence that were filed for the 2nd claim?  We the claimants, then, hope that the appellate courts see through this obvious attempt to (once again) deprive the claimants of their right for these matters to be heard in front of a jury of their peers, and the possibility that they might finally receive their due process and justice in the eyes of a court of law.

Surely the claimants deserve some closure in these matters; as well as some assurance that, in the future, should they experience flagrant violations of their rights by those acting in official offices, that they have a right to bring those violations to the Federal Judiciary and receive something that even slightly resembles justice; instead of having the whole thing tossed out at a moment’s whim, using every excuse in the book, by a Judge of the District Court, who is either not really reading or taking proper note of the facts stated in the claim; or who is purposefully ignoring any true claims of damage, so as to avoid having to grant the claimants any relief that might come to them at the cost to those she more than likely associates with closely and protects from harm, those in office in Polk County and Iowa.

The claimants, at this time, wish to nutshell and reiterate these clear points that show, absolutely, the error of the District Court in their decisions concerning these matters:

1.    That neither the State of Iowa OR the District Courts of Polk County, Iowa has had, at any time, ANY rightful or lawful jurisdiction over the claimants or their daughter, T.B., in 4 years.  This is not only because of the claimants’ NUNC PRO TUNC rescindment of all their signatures, submitted several times to the state courts (as well as in their affidavits filed in both of these matters on the District Federal Court of Iowa’s record;) their total and absolute rejection of all contracts with the United States, Inc.; and their obvious status of non-U.S. citizenship; as they are, instead, freemen of the formerly free (and now pretty much no longer existent) republic of the united States of America; but should also undeniably be a fact simply concerning the State of Iowa’s employee, defendant Nieman’s falsification and forgeries on the original order for temporary removal; and should we also mention this along with her blatant criminal actions against the plaintiffs and her obvious and total disregard of all of their civil, due process, and unalienable rights on every level; as she cruelly ripped the claimants’ daughter from the mother’s arms while the mother cried herself silly; without the presence or the consent of the LEGAL FATHER; using no lawful right or reason in doing so; and after holding E.B. and T.B. hostage at the hospital they deceitfully checked them into without their knowledge for 3 days.  These claimants have the recording of the entire horrific and totally unlawful removal and have submitted that evidence to every court mentioned, including the Federal District Court; and that evidence has been purposefully not admitted at all for 6 days after it was filed in person by Claimant Christopher (on the State’s District Court Level), rejected as new evidence so it wouldn’t have to be considered (on the Supreme Court of Iowa’s level) and totally blown over and ignored (on the Federal District Court’s level.)  For any court to admit that this evidence even exists in any way would not only totally destroy every right these courts MAY have had to involve themselves in these claimants’ affairs or concerning their stolen child, but would absolutely, and without question, show the criminality of this removal; and, God forbid, would cause all of the courts of Iowa and their judges to have to actually admit they were WRONG. This would also, of course, show that they essentially KIDNAPPED our child; and would force those of all in oversight over these courts to actually have to DO something about this, give the claimants their relief; and also charge, convict and possibly jail those responsible…and we can’t have that can we?  This evidence is, once again, not mentioned or referenced at all in the district Court Judge’s order; and because of this fact, can only serve to show the total bias and disregard of the Federal Government concerning violations of the rights of their citizens…and these claimants, as non-citizens as well.

2.   That the removing agency themselves, The Department of Human Services and their Director at that time, Charles Palmer, without question, ruled in favor of the claimants in their Child Protective Assessment Appeal, stating that the claimants’ daughter, T.B., had been taken from the claimants by the DHS IN ERROR, and that the assessment used to take her was ruled and changed to be “UNFOUNDED”.  No charges were ever filed against the claimants concerning the care of their daughter at any time in 4 years, their records were INSTANTLY expunged; and they were INSTANTLY removed from the abuse registry, following these decisions.  In summary of both points one and two, only one question could ever possibly remain:  Why have the courts of Iowa and the federal government even HESITATED for a single second in ordering this child be given back to the RIGHTFUL parents?

3.   The District Court continually refers to actions taken by the defendants as “within the scope of their normal duties.”, or to the county attorney “doing what he needs to do to affect an arrest or conviction” and to the actions of these attorneys “while in the defense of a client”, etc.  If the court could make the claimants believe that these actions were performed within the scope of the defendant’s everyday duties, it would be infinitely simpler for the claimants to accept defeat and finally give up.  If it intends to try and convince the claimants of THESE defendants doing so, however, the claimants would then have to preface that attempt with this wish: “Good luck with that.”

Is it this court’s opinion that it is within the scope of the County Attorney’s offices’ normal duties to fabricate charges with no real documented proof to back them up, or call the secret service; then lie and tell them that the claimants threatened the President’s life, in order to assure his arrest by them; or call FBI offices across the country, in an attempt to have claimant Christopher investigated and arrested, when all claimant Christopher has ever done is expose the crimes of the County Attorney, his associates and his buddies in crime?  (If the appellate court will take special note that those of the FBI and Homeland Security have NEVER been to the door of the claimants – though they were for a long time infiltrating Christopher’s computer directly; playing his messages out loud on his brother’s phone left for him in his voicemail box; keylogging in behind him on Facebook; as well as scouring his email account for evidence for over 3 years concerning these matters thanks to the calls made to them by defendant Sarcone.  But, since they have never come to Christopher’s door in person to arrest him; it should be obvious that no crimes are or have ever been committed.)  How is it that libeling and slandering the claimant, Christopher for 4 years within the normal scope of duties of both the Polk County Sheriff and the Des Moines Police Department Detective listed in this matter?  How is it within the normal scope of duties of a judge to declare that a legal father to be an extraneous father, or deny the claimant his right to question this judge’s bias in front of an appellate judge; or change the record of the court or fabricate hearings and transcripts on a whim?  Is it within the scope of a judge’s duties to enforce excessively high bails, bonds and fees in total and utter violation of the Constitution, or violate a claimant’s due process rights by denying said claimant access to the record of the court for 2 months when the claimants are representing themselves?  How is it that an attorney’s duties, in the defense of a client can be protected or claimed proper when they don’t do as their told or as they promise they will, participate in fraud, make up charges or fabricate cases and paperwork?  How is within the scope of duties of a police officer to arrest whoever they think is the perpetrator without properly identifying them or even having a warrant; or collude with their “victims” to fabricate charges or entrap people they want to have arrested or removed, because they couldn’t arrest them because they never committed a crime they can be arrested for?

These are, of course, only a few of the tens of obvious listed violations of rights and actions taken FAR BEYOND the normal scope of these official duties, and yet, the Federal Courts are obviously protecting these actions and those who committed them in grave error.

4.   The SCOTUS, those whose words become the law of this land, allegedly, has ruled TIME AND TIME AGAIN in case after case after case (the majority of those rulings have been referenced in the argument section of this brief in abundance) that the State has NO BUSINESS interfering in the affairs of parents when it comes to the raising of their children, especially in the affairs of those who have done NO PROVABLE OR CHARGEABLE WRONG.  Should this court, and the District Federal court have trouble understanding this point, the claimants point them right back to the first two points.  Is it the intention, both of the District and Appellate courts, to quite literally spit in the face of those decisions?  To do so is to destroy all hope of anything resembling any kind of justice in being done for any claimant who brings suit against any person in any position on any level of Government; and it is obviously time for the people to know that this withholding of justice happens and happens a lot.  Rest assured that they will, and that it will be plaintiff Christopher who will choose to be responsible for the distribution of that knowledge to every single citizen he can find until the day he dies.

5.   It should be obvious to the appellate court that NUMEROUS efforts to push the defendants behind the line of limitations by all of the Iowa courts IN ALL MATTERS have been taken to the extreme detriment of the claimants in these actions.  The District Court judge relates, specifically, that an example of equitable tolling is “when affirmative misconduct on the part of the defendant(s) has lulled (or CAUSED) the plaintiff into inaction.”  First, there was the misconduct of the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa taking a year and 3 months to decide the matter of the claimants’ termination of parental rights.  Then, there was the misconduct of Defendant Sarcone in conspiring with the DCFS offices in L.A. County and defendants Lane, Taylor, Blink, Egly, Kelly, Munson and witnesses Worthington and others; in creating a false case and further collusion with the same defendants and “The Des Moines Register” to ensure he was convicted of it; a case that caused claimant Christopher to spend a year in jail for nothing; as well as the misconduct of the same defendants in enforcing a ridiculously overpriced bond and bail to ensure he wouldn’t be released during the entire time before trial.  Then, there was the misconduct engaged in concerning the purposeful jailing of plaintiff Christopher by defendant Blink for the exact period of time needed to appeal that matter (and the attempt to DOUBLE that period of time by “mistake”) added to the inaction of colluding defendant Taylor when he promised he would file that appeal; and then never did, nor did he look into the possibility of a mistrial by tolling the jury as he also promised.  Then, the claimant addressed these matters and more in the Post-conviction case appeal which he applied for DURING this wrongful incarceration, and Defendant Vaudt took a full year to decide against the claimant in error, on all counts; after, and in violation of their own rules of court; they should have given summary judgement to the claimant at least 3 months before trial when the State didn’t answer the claim or do anything in the case until 2 weeks before the trial; nearly 6 months after the claimant filed his case; and only because the claimant poked defendant Sarcone with an email to tell him that he’d best get moving, or he’d lose. Are these details not, in fact, specifically descriptive of “affirmative misconduct on the part of the defendant(s)?”  The claimants believe they are.

6.    Probably worth mentioning most of all is the fact that, prior to this 4-year period, claimant Christopher had a record consisting of only 3 simple misdemeanors in 53 years, all unrelated, and unrelated entirely to anything brought against him in these 4 years.  It should strike the appellate panel odd that the plaintiff has, in the last 4 years, suffered a child being removed from both the claimants’ care for neglect (after Christopher had ALREADY raised 3 boys well into their 20’s; and all are doing just fine; and when the child was only 9 days old, hardly any time to determine “abuse”), lost an appeal of his termination in the Iowa Supreme Court; was then accused of harassing CASE ACTIVE SOCIAL WORKERS, during the course of their required duties TWICE (and successfully convicted of it the 2nd time using NO EVIDENCE TO BACK IT UP); was arrested by the Secret Service for threatening the President; was arrested for threatening a newspaper editor; was then arrested and convicted for threatening to kill a woman he had only met once (when he didn’t even know where she lived or worked; didn’t have a car, and lived 84 miles away; just 2 days after he emailed 8000 L.A. county social workers to let them know that their business was being aired on his blog); was then arrested for violating his probation (when he voluntarily asked to be jailed for a year instead just before that); then was and has been continuously called on by the county attorney in countless offices of law enforcement and investigated  ACROSS THE COUNTRY for possible acts of terrorism (and, to reiterate a previously stated point - NO ARRESTS HAVE OCCURRED BECAUSE OF THOSE INVESTIGATIONS).  Odder still is the fact that the same claimant hasn’t had any trouble since he moved out of Iowa to South Dakota a year and a half ago; nor has he been accused or arrested for a single thing.  Also, Claimant Elizabeth has NO RECORD WHATSOEVER, and, prior to this time, has never been in trouble, has never been accused of anything, and has never been arrested…EVER!

In summary, all claimed defenses for most of these defendants do not and should not apply, considering only the facts that the claimants’ daughter was UNLAWFULLY and ILLEGALLY KIDNAPPED FROM THE CLAIMANTS; and was not returned when they were cleared of the allegations.  If that isn’t enough, how about the NUMEROUS violations of their rights, MORE SO of claimant Christopher’s rights by the majority of the defendants in these matters?  No defense can rightfully or possibly exist, due to the PURPOSEFUL violations of all the claimants’ rights:  the obvious CONSPIRACY against these rights, as well as the activities engaged in for profit utilizing the claimants’ daughter.  Finally, depravation of the claimants’ due justice and relief by all the courts on every level thus far is very clear and evident.  Should this appellate court find in favor of the defending parties, the claimants will pursue these matters further; not only in the SCOTUS, but before WE THE PEOPLE and their Grand Jury, directly before the DOJ, before the President of the United States and the NATIONAL judicial oversight committee head; and will add those involved in the lesser courts’ decisions, and those that continue to deprive the plaintiffs of their justice in both these courts to the existing defendant’s list for their conspiracy against the claimants as well.

Christopher (Bruce), The Living Man

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